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iv PREFACE
Chapter 1
Introduction
My thesis is centered on the macroeconomic causes and consequences of income
inequality. The first two essays develop theoretical frameworks to analyze the
impact of income inequality on technical change and long-term economic growth.
These essays sprung from the very fruitful collaboration with my main thesis
supervisor, Josef Zweimüller, who ignited my great interest in this topic. In
the last essay I study the effect of financial booms and asset bubbles on wage
inequality and sector employment both theoretically and empirically. This last
topic was motivated by my previous work experience, allowing me to combine
my applied knowledge accumulated in the financial sector with my modeling
skills.
The first two essays analyze the impact of income inequality on the direction
of technical change in models of endogenous growth with horizontal and verti-
cal innovation. Traditionally, endogenous growth models assumed preferences
admitting a representative household. If preferences are such that the com-
position and quality of consumption is identical across households, the income
distribution does not matter for the aggregate consumption structure. In such
an environment, models with process innovations (e.g. introducing new types of
inputs) are mathematical identical to models with product innovations (see Ace-
moglu, 2009). The distinction between process innovations introducing higher
quality versions of existing goods versus versions that can be manufactured at
lower costs is less relevant, as well, if all households have the same willingness
to pay for quality, which is implicitly assumed by admitting a representative
household. However, casual observation and empirical evidence suggest that the
consumption structure and willingness to pay for quality differs across house-
holds in reality, at odds with the representative household assumption. Richer
1
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households not only consume a larger variety of goods but also have a higher
willingness to pay for quality upgrades. If the willingness to pay for variety and
quality is determined by income levels, the income distribution affects prices and
market sizes of firms and thereby incentives to invest in horizontal and vertical
innovation differently. Consequently, the income distribution and the distinction
between different types of innovations matter for aggregate outcomes.
The second chapter titled "The Macroeconomics of Model T" (Foellmi,
Wuergler, and Zweimüller, 2009) studies a model of endogenous growth where
firms invest both in product and process innovations. Product innovations intro-
duce consumer goods which are affordable only to the rich. Process innovations
decrease costs per unit of quality of the original making the good affordable to
the poor. The automobile, one of the most important durable goods in modern
industrial societies, provides a prototypical example for such an innovation cycle.
Initially a luxury good consumed only by very rich households, things started to
change in 1908, when Ford introduced the Model T, the car that "put America
on wheels". The concept was the use of assembly lines to produce a low-cost,
low-quality car affordable to the middle class. Model T became a huge success
and initiated the takeoff in car ownership in the U.S. Motivated by this pattern
which has also been observed for many other consumer durables, the essay de-
velops a formal endogenous growth model where indivisibilities of consumption
goods let the composition of demand by rich consumers systematically differ
from that of poorer households. Income inequality thus shapes product cycles
and generates substantially different incentives for product and process inno-
vation. An egalitarian society creates incentives for process innovations (such
as the Model T) whereas an unequal society favors product innovations (new
luxuries). The inequality-growth relationship depends on the type of knowl-
edge spillovers. The basic framework determines the fraction of mass producers
but leaves individual product cycles indeterminate. The chapter also discusses
natural extensions (learning-by-doing, hierarchic preferences) that generate de-
terministic product cycles where an initially exclusive good (which only the rich
can afford) is subsequently transformed into a mass consumption good.
While the second chapter focuses on process innovations that cut manufac-
turing costs (at a quality discount), process innovations that introduce higher
quality versions of a variety are as important in reality. The third chapter
titled "Income Distribution and Product Quality versus Variety" (Wuergler,
2010a) explores the effects of income inequality on product quality and variety
in a simple heterogeneous household economy. The income distribution is a
key determinant of the quality levels and varieties produced and consumed in
3an economy when consumers’ willingness to pay for quality and variety differs
across levels of income. The chapter shows that product variety is unambigu-
ously higher in an unequal society, whereas the quality level depends on the
interaction between inequality and technology. If quality upgrades require high
additional setup costs, the smaller markets of more unequal societies lower in-
centives for quality improvements. If in contrast quality upgrades entail high
additional production costs, inequality increases quality by raising the willing-
ness to pay for the manufacturing-intensive higher quality levels. In the presence
of spillovers in vertical and horizontal R&D, a society may face a tradeoff be-
tween growth in quality and variety. Whereas an unequal society experiences
higher growth in variety, growth in quality is higher in a more egalitarian society
depending on technology. Finally, one can show that irrespective of technology,
technical change is directed toward expanding variety if inequality is high, while
it is biased toward improving quality in a more egalitarian society.
The final chapter is concerned with the causes rather than the consequences
of income inequality. Titled "The Impact of Financial Booms on Labor Mar-
kets" (Wuergler, 2010b), the chapter studies the effect of financial booms and
periods of extreme asset valuations on the relative demand for skills and the
wage structure. The substantial rise in wage inequality in the U.S. since the
late 1970s has been accompanied by a major expansion of financial services,
a series of asset bubbles, and rising relative wages and relative education in
the financial industry. I motivate and develop a theoretical framework where
financial institutions benefit from financial booms and asset bubbles. Yet the
complexity and novelty of financial products and fundamentals surrounding bub-
bles favor the supremacy of skilled individuals in exploiting these opportunities.
Hence, financial booms increase opportunities for skilled labor, contributing to
the rise in overall wage inequality in the economy. Simple extensions of the
basic framework allow us to study the implications of financial regulation and
globalization of financial services, as well as further topics. Finally, the chapter
documents and compares relative wage and employment patterns in the U.S.,
U.K., Germany, and France, providing suggestive evidence for the theoretical
framework.
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Chapter 2
The Macroeconomics of
Model T
Joint with Reto Foellmi and Josef Zweimüller
"Consumer goods inventions that cut both cost and quality but
reduce the former more than the latter, such as the Model T, have
historically been an important means for transforming the luxuries
of the rich into the conveniences of the poor."
Jacob Schmookler, Invention and Economic Growth (1966)
2.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a model of endogenous growth based on a cycle of product
and process innovations. Product innovations introduce new goods which are
affordable only to the rich. Process innovations lead to the adoption of new
production processes that reduce the cost per unit of quality, making the good
affordable to the poorer classes. As emphasized by Schmookler (1966), such
a cycle of product and process innovations has historically been important to
transform the luxuries of the rich into mass consumption markets.
The automobile, one of the most important durable goods in modern indus-
trial societies, provides a prototypical example for such an innovation cycle. In
the United States, the history of the commercial automobile production started
with Charles and Frank Duryea who founded the Duryea Motor Wagon Com-
pany in 1893, the first American automobile manufacturing company followed
5
6 CHAPTER 2. THE MACROECONOMICS OF MODEL T
by Oldsmobile and Cadillac in 1902 and 1903. At the time, the automobile
was a luxury good consumed only by very rich households. Things started to
change in 1908, when Ford introduced the Model T , the car that "put America
on wheels". The concept was the use of assembly lines to produce a low-cost,
low-quality car affordable to the middle class. Model T became a huge success
and initiated the takeoff in car ownership in the U.S. Between 1908 and 1927
more than 15 million units of Model T were manufactured. The introduction
of Model T contributed crucially to the fast diffusion of the automobile in the
U.S.1
Product cycles where a new invention created a luxury good for the rich
and subsequent innovations turned the luxury into a mass consumption good
for lower classes are not confined to the auto industry. It has been important
for many other consumer durables such as the refrigerator, the radio, the TV,
and the computer, showing very similar patterns of innovation cycles.
We develop a formal endogenous growth model where firms engage both in
product and process innovations of indivisible consumption goods. These in-
divisibilities let the composition of demand by rich consumers systematically
differ from that of poorer households. The rich do not only purchase a larger
variety of consumption goods, but also do consume these goods in better quality.
Poorer households consume only a fraction of the available varieties and prefer
lower qualities to higher ones. Income inequality thus shapes product cycles
and generates substantially different incentives for product and process innova-
tion. Put differently, inequality determines the direction of technical change.
Whereas an egalitarian society creates strong incentives for process innovations
(such as the Model T), an unequal society creates strong incentives for product
innovations (new luxuries).
Our analysis shows how the growth process depends on the extent of inequal-
ity in a society. First, the extent of inequality endogenously determines prices
and market sizes. It turns out that higher inequalities allow innovators to charge
higher prices and mark-ups, both for high- and for low-quality goods. Higher
inequality reduces the number of mass markets due to two effects. The direct
effect is that low incomes of the poor limit demand and the scope for mass pro-
duction. The indirect effect comes from higher prices that limit the purchasing
power of the poor even further. As a result, our analysis shows in a transparant
way how inequality translates into price and market size effects. Second, prices
and market sizes determine the incentives for product and process innovations.
The way how these incentives eventually affect long-run growth depends on the
1Encyclopaedia Britannica
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source of technical progress. If technical progress is mainly driven by product
innovations, inequality is beneficial for long-run growth. In contrast, if techni-
cal progress is mainly driven by process innovations, the relationship between
inequality and growth is turned upside down and inequality becomes harmful
for long-run growth. In the presence of complementarities between process and
product innovations, the relationship between inequality and growth becomes
hump-shaped. Complementarities imply that an economy which has invested
relatively little in process innovation is likely to benefit more from process inno-
vations and vice versa. In that case, both very high levels and very low levels of
inequality are harmful for growth, and growth is maximized at an intermediate
extent of economic inequality.
In our basic model, we make the simplifying assumption that goods are sym-
metric. The general equilibrium determines the fraction of exclusive producers
(that have incurred only the product innovation and supply only the high qual-
ity) and the fraction of mass producers (that have incurred both the product
and process innovations cost and can supply both the high and the low quality).
However, the product cycle of a particular variety is indeterminate. We show
two natural ways to get rid of this indeterminacy and incorporate deterministic
product cycles. A first way involves learning-by-doing where production expe-
rience lets production costs fall over time. Goods that are introduced earlier
can be produced at lower cost, increasing innovators’ incentive to open up mass
markets. A second way is to assume hierarchic preferences where goods can be
ranked according to priority in consumption (i.e. yield asymmetric utilities).
In that case, product innovations follow the consumption hierarchy in the sense
that product R&D expenditures are directed towards (not yet invented) goods
with highest priority and process innovations are undertaken when the incomes
of the poor have sufficiently increased. Both extensions generate a determin-
istic cycle with an initial phase of exclusion (only the rich can afford the new
product) followed by the phase of mass consumption.
While the major part of our analysis studies the balanced growth path, we
also explore transitional dynamics. Transitional dynamics reveal that both de-
mand and supply shocks may trigger periods of industrial change in which a
series of process innovations increases production and access to consumption
markets. A large drop in inequality (such as the one that followed the Great
Depression and WWII) triggers an initial phase where innovation activity is di-
rected towards process innovations that facilitate mass production. Hence, our
model provides an explanation for the boom in consumer durables in the U.S.
(and other industrialized countries) in the post-war era. Similarly, a positive
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productivity shock lowering the costs of process innovation triggers an indus-
trial revolution where an initially stagnant economy of craftsmanship and highly
exclusive production is transformed into a modern society with broad participa-
tion and growth. We show that inequality — while initially beneficial for growth
in the exclusive society — may eventually become harmful for growth after the
economy has run through the transition phase and the economy has become
a mass consumption society. In particular, our analysis predicts that in early
stages of development (before the introduction of mass production technologies)
inequality is beneficial for growth because technical progress is mainly driven
by the introduction of new products for which the rich are willing to pay high
prices. In later stages of development (after the introduction of mass production
technologies) growth is higher in more egalitarian societies because process in-
novations become important drivers for growth. To generate the incentives for
adopting these technologies, large markets and a high purchasing power of the
lower classes are prerequisites.2
Our analysis extends the existing literature in at least three dimensions.
First, our work is related to the literature on directed technical change (Ace-
moglu, 1998 and 2002, Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001, and others). This litera-
ture analyzes the forces that generate biases in technical change towards one par-
ticular production factor. Similar to our work, directed technical change models
emphasize the tension between price and market size effects. However, the em-
phasis is on the relative demand for production factors, i.e. the supply/cost
side of the economy. In contrast, our model focuses on demand/income effects.
This channel generates an important role for the distribution of income across
households, a mechanism that is absent in directed technical change models.
Second, our work highlights the distinct role that product and process inno-
vations can play in the process of long-run growth. In this dimension we differ
from the large literature on the determinants of the aggregate technical progress
(Romer 1990, Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Grossman and Helpman 1991, etc.).
Aggregate models of product and process innovations are often mathematically
similar (Acemoglu, 2009), that is the source of technical change is not essen-
tial to answer the question of what factors influence economic growth. This is
different in our framework where incentives for product inventions and process
innovations are subject to systematic differences, in particular with respect to
2 In Galor and Moav (2004, 2006) the inequality-growth relationship also changes across
stages of development. Due to non-homothetic preferences over consumption and bequests,
inequality leads to higher growth in early stages of development and to lower growth in later
stages.
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the extent of inequality in the society.
Third, we speak to a small literature that has studied the impact of income
inequality on technical progress. Matsuyama (2002) demonstrates the virtuous
cycle between learning-by-doing and a large middle class, enabling the Flying
Geese pattern discussed later in the chapter. Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006)
focus on product inventions and the scope of innovators’ price setting power
in the presence of a wealthy upper class. The present essay can be viewed as
a synthesis of these classes of models. Our analysis highlights the conditions
under which an unequal society suffers from lack of process innovations (and/or
learning-by-doing) and from a small range of mass markets. Our analysis also
makes precise the conditions under which such a society benefits from large
mark-ups and high incentives to open up completely new product lines.3
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes empirical and his-
torical evidence motivating the key assumptions and mechanisms of our model.
Section 3 introduces the formal framework, section 4 presents the solution of
the balanced growth equilibrium, and section 5 discusses the relationship be-
tween inequality and growth. Section 6 introduces alternative specifications of
preferences and technology to allow for deterministic product cycles. Section
7 analyzes transitional dynamics. We conclude with a summary and potential
directions for future research.
2.2 Motivating Evidence
Casual observations and empirical evidence suggest that there is a strong im-
pact of income on the number of varieties purchased by households, which is
at odds with homothetic preferences.4 Figure 2.1 illustrates this point by ex-
hibiting the shares of ownership of various consumer durables of urban Chinese
households (National Bureau of Statistics of China). At any given point in
time, most types of consumer durables are only consumed by a fraction of the
households. The figure also shows that levels of penetration rise over time. This
3Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) study the role of income distribution on technology
adoption in a static context. Falkinger (1994) develops a model where inequality affects tech-
nical progress via aggregate output of consumer goods. The effect of inequality on technical
progress in quality ladder models is explored in Li (2003) and Zweimueller and Brunner (2005).
4 Jackson (1984) finds that the richest income class consumed twice as many different
goods as the poorest class, using micro data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Falkinger and Zweimueller (1996) generate similar results using
aggregate cross-country data from the International Comparison Project of the UN on per-
capita expenditure levels on ninety-one different consumption categories.
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is what Matsuyama (2002) calls the "Flying Geese pattern", in which a series
of products takes off one after another, following an increase in productivity
and income. This gradual increase in penetration levels was first emphasized
by Katona (1964) who observed that the mass consumption society is the last
stage of a process in which former luxury goods, consumed only by a few, priv-
ileged households, have been transformed into necessities for most households
(i.e. mass consumption goods). Many products such as cars, radios, television
sets, washing machines, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners and, more recently, com-
puters have gone through such product cycles in the developed world, and are
presently going through similar cycles in developing countries. Besides plain
income effects, key elements of such product cycles are process innovations that
cut the costs of production sufficiently. After a product has been invented, ini-
tial manufacturing costs are usually quite high, and sales volumes linger as the
good can only be afforded by a few rich households. The takeoff and subsequent
proliferation of the product is often ignited and enabled by a series of process
innovations that reduce manufacturing costs significantly.5
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Figure 2.1: Ownership of consumer durables in Urban Chinese households (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics of China)
As mentioned above, one of the most famous historical examples for such
5Our analysis highlights the relevance of major product and process innovations that create
new product lines and subsequent mass consumption goods. Notice that in reality both mass
consumption goods and luxury goods are continuously improved in quality. While this is
clearly of high relevance in practice, we abstract from continuous quality improvements in our
framework.
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an innovation pattern is the Ford Model T. It is generally regarded as the first
affordable automobile, the car that "put America on wheels". One major reason
behind the huge success story of Model T were Ford’s innovations, including
assembly line production instead of individual hand crafting, as well as the
concept of paying the workers a wage proportionate to the cost of the car, so
that they would provide a ready made market. Both innovations led to a huge
increase in productivity. In total, Ford manufactured more than 15 million
Model T’s from 1908 to 1927, which contributed critically to the fast diffusion
of the automobile. Figure 2.2 shows automobile and truck registrations in the
U.S. from 1900 to 1970. The number of car registrations took off in the period
of the Model T, and reached 23 million in 1927. Whereas 1% of households in
the U.S. owned a car in 1908, the hour of birth of the Model T, penetration
reached 50% in 1924.6
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Figure 2.2: Automobile and truck registrations in the US in 1’000 units (US
Census)
The product cycle that led to the Model T is not specific to the U.S. but can
be observed in other parts of the world. Most of the large European economies
had their own Model T which brought the car to the people. In Germany, a
"people’s car" — Volkswagen ("Beetle") — was initially introduced in the 1930s
6See Model T Facts on media.ford.com, Encyclopaedia Britannica, and Bowden and Offer
(1994) for penetration levels.
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(and fostered by the Nazi regime). Austin 7 (1922), Fiat (1936) and Citroën
(1949)7 brought the car to the people of the UK, Italy and France, respectively.
In rich countries, the introduction of mass-produced cars was an important step
in the history of the manufacturing industry. And what has been important
for rich countries in the past is starting to become relevant in poorer countries
today. In Asia for example, Tata has recently announced to produce the world’s
cheapest car, mainly for the Indian market.
The auto industry is an example for the types of innovation and product
cycles that our model aims to capture. While it provided the prototypical ex-
ample, there are many other goods that experienced very similar patterns of
innovation and market expansion. Two centuries after artificial refrigeration
was pioneered by Dr. William Cullen, a GE home refrigerator cost around 700$
in 1922, compared to 450$ for a 1922 Ford Model T. Penetration barely reached
1% in the U.S. in 1925. The introduction of freon expanded the refrigerator
market during the 1930s, with penetration reaching 50% by 1938. Refrigerators
went into mass production after WWII, and by the year 1948 75% of all house-
holds owned a fridge.8 The history of television started with first experimental
transmissions made by Charles Jenkins in 1923. Television usage in the U.S.
exploded after WWII. Having reached a penetration of 1% in 1948, it only took
5 years to reach 50%, and 2 more years to reach 75%. The rapid diffusion was
enabled by the lifting of the manufacturing freeze, war-related technological ad-
vances, the expansion of the television networks, the drop in television prices
enabled by mass production and additional disposable income.9 A very similar
evolution can be traced for computers. Spurred by calculation requirements for
ballistics and decryption during WWII, the first electronic digital computers
were developed between 1940-1945. Developments of the microprocessor led
to the proliferation of the personal computer after about 1975. Mass market
pre-assembled computers allowed a wider range of people to use computers, and
penetration reached 1% in the U.S. around 1980. Component prices continued
to fall since then, leading to continuous price declines. Penetration reached 50%
around 2000. The emergence of Netbooks in 2007, a new market segment of
7Citroën director Pierre-Jules Boulanger’s early design brief for the 2CV supposedly asked
for "a vehicle capable of transporting two peasants in boots, 100 pounds of potatoes or a barrel
of wine, at a maximum speed of 40 mph, [...] Its price should be well below the one of our
Traction Avant and, finally, its appearance is of little importance." (Translation, Technologie
SCEREN - CNDP no. 138, 2005)
8Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers, "The Story of the Refrigerator;" Bowden
and Offer (1994)
9 Steven Schoenherr, "History of Television," History Server of University of San Diego;
Bowden and Offer (1994)
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small, energy-efficient ultra low-cost devices, is likely to advance penetration
significantly, especially in developing countries.10
These examples demonstrate how closely process innovations and mass con-
sumption markets are intertwined: Process innovations reducing manufacturing
costs are crucial elements for tapping and proliferating mass consumption mar-
kets. Mass production, in turn, facilitates process innovation by increasing
learning-by-doing and specialization benefits. Higher inequality raises the pur-
chasing power of rich households, increasing demand for variety and product
innovation. A more egalitarian society, on the other hand, raises the number
of mass consumption markets and thus incentives for process innovation. Com-
paring the experience of Japan and the U.S. over the last decades provides
suggestive evidence: Income concentration in Japan has remained relatively low
after WWII in contrast to the U.S. (Moriguchi and Saez, 2005). During the
same period of time, Japan has made itself a name as country of lean produc-
tion and just-in-time management, i.e. process innovation. A recent study by
Nagaoka and Walsh (2009), using data from the RIETI-Georgia Tech inventor
survey, indeed shows that R&D in Japan is more biased to process innovation,
in contrast to the U.S. where it is more directed to product innovation.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 The Distribution of Endowments
We assume there are L households that inelastically supply L units of la-
bor. βL < L households are poor (indexed by P ) and (1− β)L are rich (in-
dexed by R). Income differences arise from two sources. First, households are
unequally endowed with units of labor. A poor household is endowed with
P = θ < 1 labor units, and the labor endowment of a rich household is
R = (1− βθ) / (1− β) ≥ 1.11 The parameters β and θ fully characterize
the distribution of labor endowments. The corresponding Lorenz-curve is piece-
wise linear with slope θ for population shares between 0 and β; and slope
(1 − βθ)/(1 − β) for population shares between β and 1. Notice that com-
mon measures of inequality (such as the Gini coefficient and the coefficient of
variation) indicate an increase in inequality when θ falls and/or β rises. It is
10 Jeffrey Shallit, "A Very Brief History of Computer Science," University of Waterloo; W.
Warner, "Great Moments in Microprocessor History," Technical Library IBM; "Computer Use
and Ownership," U.S. Census, and authors’ estimates
11 Since the average labor endowment per household is unity we must have βP +(1−β)R =
1. Setting P = θ we get R = (1− βθ)/(1− β).
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assumed that the distribution of labor endowments is constant over time.
The second source of income differences is due to inequality in wealth, based
on ownership in monopolistic firms. We denote by v(t) the per-capita value of
these firms at date t and assume that a poor household owns wealth vP (t) =
θv(t)v(t) and a rich household owns wealth vR(t) = [(1− βθv(t)) /(1− β)] v(t) where
θv(t) < 1 and (1− βθv(t)) /(1 − β) ≥ 1. In analogy to the labor endowment
distribution, the distribution of wealth is determined by β and θv(t). Unlike
the labor endowment distribution, the wealth distribution can change over time
since vP (t) and vR(t) are endogenously determined by households’ savings deci-
sions. In sections 4 to 6 below we will study balanced growth paths. Along such
paths, all households have the same savings rates and the wealth distribution
is stationary, θv(t) = θv for all t. When we analyze balanced growth paths
below we will assume θ = θv = θ. While this is clearly a rather special case,
it keeps the analysis simple and transparent. Allowing labor endowment and
wealth distributions to differ does not change the results in any economically
relevant way. For instance, in comparing steady states, it does not make a dif-
ference whether the resulting incomes differences arise due to an unequal labor
endowment distribution, due to an unequal wealth distribution, or both. What
matters is inequality in total lifetime incomes. However, when we study transi-
tional dynamics in section 7, we have to account for the fact that households’
savings rates need no longer be equal in the transition to a new steady state. As
the wealth distribution changes over time we have to abandon the assumption
θ = θv = θ and make the time-dependence of θv(t) explicit.
2.3.2 Technology and Technical Progress
Labor is the only production factor, the labor market is competitive and the
market clearing wage is denoted by w(t). Production activities are undertaken
in monopolistic firms that supply differentiated products and operate with an
increasing returns-to-scale technology. The creation of a firm requires a product
innovation, i.e. an investment of F˜ (t) units of labor that yields the blueprint
for a completely new product (e.g. the automobile). Once such a product
innovation has been made, the innovating firm obtains a patent of infinite length
granting the exclusive right to market this product. We think of a product
innovation as a luxury good that initially may be affordable only to the rich
and that is costly in production. We assume a new product has quality qh and
requires a (high) labor input a˜h(t) per unit of output. After a successful product
innovation, the firm has the option to undertake a process innovation that cuts
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both the quality of the product and its production cost. More precisely, we
assume that after a further investment of G˜(t) labor units, the product can
also be supplied in lower quality ql < qh and produced with a lower labor input
a˜l(t) < a˜h(t), the quality-cost ratio is higher, however, ql/a˜l(t) > qh/a˜h(t). This
captures Schmookler’s idea that mass consumer good inventions cut both costs
and quality but the former more than the latter.12
In what follows we will refer to firms that have incurred both the product
and the process innovation as "mass producers". Firms that have made only
the product but not the process innovation will be called "exclusive produc-
ers". The term "exclusive" is suggestive in the sense that it refers to both
a high "exclusive" quality and to a situation where firms "exclude" the poor
from consumption by setting prices that only rich but not poor households can
afford.13
Product and process innovations are the driving forces behind technical
progress and long-run growth. Sustained growth is enabled by knowledge spillovers
from past research activities on current productivity levels.14 Labor require-
ments in the various activities are inversely related to an aggregate stock of
knowledge A(t) such that F˜ (t) = F/A(t), a˜h(t) = ah/A(t), G˜(t) = G/A(t), and
a˜l(t) = al/A(t) where F , G, ah, and al are exogenous, positive constants. Bal-
anced growth requires the stock of knowledge A(t) to be a linearly homogeneous
function of the range of product varieties N(t) and the range of varieties that un-
derwent process innovations M(t). For analytical convenience, we assume that
A(t) is linked to past product and process innovations via the CES-function
A(t) = [ψN(t)γ + (1− ψ)M(t)γ ]1/γ , (2.1)
12Note that we abstract from continuous quality improvements of existing goods which are
important features of reality. The model could be easily adapted to include exogenous quality
improvements. If qh and ql increased at an exogenous rate, all features of our model would
remain the same. We will also touch upon quality improvements when discussing learning-by-
doing in Section 6. Furthermore, both high- and low-quality versions of a variety are produced
by one firm as a first approximation. In reality, process innovations are often undertaken by
competitors to enter an existing product line. Hence, one could extend the present model to
a duopolist setting to study the competitive effects of the process innovator on the original
product inventor.
13Note that the way we use the terms "exclusive producers" and "mass producers" refers to
access to technology rather than to quantity of production. It may be that a mass producer
makes a higher profit by selling only to the rich and a luxury producer may be better off by
selling to the rich and the poor. We will see that such "strange" outcomes never happen along
a balanced growth path but may be temporarily relevant during transitions towards a new
steady state (see section 6 below).
14The knowledge-driven specification is more simple and transparent in a setting with con-
sumer good varieties of different quality as opposed to the lab equipment R&D specification.
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where γ < 1 parametrizes the substitutability between experience in product
and process innovations, and ψ ∈ [0, 1] the importance of product relative to
process innovations for knowledge accumulation. If ψ is high, technical progress
and growth are mainly driven by experience accumulated in product R&D.
If it is low, process innovations are the main driver. The lower γ, the more
complementary product and process innovations are. Note that both R&D
sectors benefit equally from spillovers. An extension of the model could study
spillovers affecting product and process innovation differently, which will be
discussed when we present the main results. We will show that in an equilibrium
where only the producers who choose to sell to all households have invested in
process innovation, the inequality-growth relationship depends on the specific
form of spillovers. In order to highlight that our basic results and intuitions
do not necessarily rely on specific externalities between product and process
innovations, Section 6 studies an alternative setup in which manufacturing costs
are lowered through learning-by-doing instead of intentional process innovations.
2.3.3 Preferences and Consumer Choices
Households have an infinite horizon and choose consumption both within and
across periods to maximize lifetime utility. At a given point in time, a household
chooses consumption from the continuum of N(t) goods. Among the N(t) firms
that exist at date t there are those that made a product innovation but have
not yet made a process innovation (exclusive producers) and other firms that
have made both the product and the process innovation (mass producers). This
means M(t) goods are supplied both in high and low quality and N(t)−M(t)
goods are supplied in high quality only. In general, the prices may vary both
across goods and across qualities and may change over time. We denote the
price of good j and quality q at date t by p(j, q, t).
The crucial assumption adopted here is that goods are indivisible. More
precisely, the household has to decide whether or not to consume good j, and
if yes, whether to consume it in high or low quality. There are three outcomes:
either a household consumes (i) one unit in high quality, (ii) one unit in low
quality, or (iii) does not consume at all. It turns out that such a discrete
specification of preferences is a simple and tractable way to introduce non-
homotheticities and to allow for a situation where rich households do not only
consume a broader menu of goods but also consume the purchased goods in
higher quality. Denote by xi(j, t) an indicator function that takes value 1 if
household i consumes good j at date t, and takes value 0 if not. Similarly,
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denote by qi(j, t) the chosen quality level which can take only one of the two
values {qh, ql}. The household’s objective function is given by
Ui(τ) =
∫ ∞
τ
1
1− σ
[∫ N(t)
0
xi(j, t)qi(j, t)dj
]1−σ
e−ρ(t−τ) dt,
where ρ is the rate of time preference, and σ parametrizes the willingness to
shift consumption across time. The term in brackets can be interpreted as
an instantaneous consumption aggregator which, for later use, we denote by
ci(t) ≡
∫ N(t)
0
xi(j, t)qi(j, t)dj. The consumer chooses the time paths of xi(j, t)
and qi(j, t) so as to maximize the above lifetime utility subject to the lifetime
budget constraint
∫ ∞
τ
[∫ N(t)
0
p(j, qi, t)xi(j, t)dj
]
e−R(t,τ)dt ≤
∫ ∞
τ
iw(t)e
−R(t,τ)dt+ vi(τ),
where R(t, τ) =
∫ t
τ
r(s)ds is the cumulative discount factor between dates τ
and t, r(t) is the interest rate, i is the (time-invariant) labor endowment of
household i, and vi(τ) is the initial wealth level owned by the household.
The first-order conditions for the discrete consumption choice of good j are
given by
{xi(j, t), qi(j, t)} =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
{1, qh}
{1, ql}
{0, ·}
if qhμi(t)− p(j, qh, t) ≥ max [0, qlμi(t)− p(j, ql, t)] ,
if qlμi(t)− p(j, ql, t) ≥ max [0, qhμi(t)− p(j, qh, t)] ,
otherwise,
(2.2)
where
μi(t) = ci(t)
−σ/λi(t)
is household i’s willingness to pay per unit of quality and λi(t) the marginal
utility of wealth at date t (the current-value multiplier). These first order con-
ditions are very intuitive. The condition in the first line of (2.2) says that good
j will be consumed in high quality if the consumer’s willingness to pay for the
high quality qhμi(t) is sufficiently larger than its price p(j, qh, t) so that both
alternatives (purchasing not at all and purchasing the low quality) lead to a
worse outcome. In other words, there needs to be a utility gain and it needs to
be larger than the utility gain from purchasing the low quality. Similarly, the
consumer will purchase the low quality if there is a utility gain that is larger than
when purchasing the high quality. Otherwise, the household does not consume
good j at all.
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2.3.4 Price Setting and Profits
Firms make their pricing decisions on the basis of market demand functions that
derive from households’ optimal consumption choices given by the conditions in
(2.2). Notice that the willingness to pay for quality k ∈ {l, h} is always larger
for a rich household than for a poor household, qkμR > qkμP . (For simplicity,
we omit time indices in this section).
An exclusive producer can supply the product only in high. When the firm
charges a price below (or equal to) qhμP both rich and poor households will
purchase the good and market demand is L. When the price is above qhμP but
below (or equal to) qhμR only rich households purchase the good and market
demand is (1 − β)L. When the price is larger than qhμR not even the rich are
willing to purchase and market demand is zero. The exclusive producer has
essentially two options: (i) set price qhμR and sell to rich households only; or
(ii) set price qhμP and sell to the whole customer base.
Amass producer can supply the good both in high and low quality. The mass
producer has in principle the following options: (i) supply only the low quality at
price qlμP to all households; (ii) supply the low quality at price qlμR only to rich
households; (iii) supply the high quality at price qhμR only to rich households;
or (iv) supply the high quality at price qhμP to all households. Actually, the
mass producer has a fifth option and this option is the most interesting one in
the present context: (v) set price qlμP for the low quality and sell it to poor
households and set price qlμP + (qh − ql)μR for the high quality and sell it to
rich households. Notice that under this fifth option the firm cannot fully exploit
the willingness to pay of rich consumers since they can switch to the low quality.
To attract the rich households as customers for the high quality, the firm needs
to set a price that is not larger than the price that makes a rich household
indifferent between consuming the low quality and consuming the high quality.
From (2.2) it is straightforward to verify that, when the low quality has price
qlμP , the highest price that induces the rich to purchase the high rather than
the low quality is qlμP +(qh − ql)μR. To ensure that in equilibrium a situation
emerges, where a mass producer sells the high quality to the rich and the low
quality to the poor, we make the following assumption:
The following three conditions are satisfied: (i) (qh − ql)μR > (a˜h − a˜l)w,
(ii) (1− β) (qhμR − a˜hw) ≥ (qhμP − a˜hw), and (iii) qlμP−(1− β) qlμR−βa˜lw ≥
0, where μR and μP are determined by equations (2.6) - (2.9).
The willingnesses to pay of rich and poor households, μR and μP , will be
determined endogenously in general equilibrium (see next section). Condition
(i) says that the willingness to pay of rich households for the quality gap qh− ql
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is sufficiently high relative to the cost gap (a˜h − a˜l)w so that a mass producer
strictly prefers selling the high quality to the rich and the low quality to the
poor at prices qlμP and qlμP + (qh − ql)μR, respectively, to selling the low
quality at price qlμP to all consumers. Condition (ii) says that an exclusive
firm weakly prefers selling only to rich households at price qhμR rather than
selling to all households at price qhμP . Condition (iii) says that a producer
with access to the mass production technology is weakly better off separating
the market (selling the low quality to the poor and the high quality to the rich)
rather than selling the high quality only to the rich at a higher price qhμR. Our
assumption ql/a˜l > qh/a˜h guarantees that (ii) and (iii) are compatible.
In the next sections we study the balanced growth path where all exclusive
producers sell their high quality only to the rich, and all mass producers sell
the low quality to the poor and the high quality to the rich. Along this path
all inequalities in Assumption 1 hold strictly. This does not need to be the
case during a transition towards the balanced growth path. The case where
condition (ii) holds with equality and condition (iii) holds with strict inequal-
ity corresponds to a situation where the economy has few mass producers, so
that the poor purchase all mass consumption goods in low quality but also pur-
chase some luxuries. The case where condition (iii) holds with equality and
condition (ii) holds with strict inequality corresponds to a situation where there
are so many mass producers that the poor cannot afford to purchase all mass
consumption goods but only a subset of them.15
Proposition 1 a) Suppose conditions (ii) and (iii) in Assumption 1 hold with
strict inequality. Then every exclusive producer sells only to the rich, charges
price pe = qhμR and earns profit πe = (1− β)L (pe − a˜hw). Every mass
producer sells the low quality to the poor at price pl = qlμP and the high
quality to the rich at price ph = qlμP + (qh − ql)μR and earns profit πm =
(1− β)L (ph − a˜hw)+βL (pl − a˜lw) . b) When condition (ii) holds with equality,
exclusive firms are indifferent between selling only to rich and to all households.
c) When condition (iii) holds with equality, mass firms are indifferent between
selling the high quality only to the rich at price qhμR and separating the market.
In that case we have πe = πm.
Proof. See Appendix A.
15The assumption ql/a˜l > qh/a˜h precludes that both (ii) and (iii) hold with equality. Also
notice that the rich purchase all goods in every case. Both exclusive and mass producers which
do not sell to the rich have strictly lower profits and hence will undercut prices to get the rich
as customers. Similarly, firms that sell to some poor households sell to all poor households.
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It is also instructive to see what happens if some of the conditions of As-
sumption 1 are violated. In that case, mass producers supply only one quality.
They may sell only the low quality to the whole customer base. This case is
similar to the one we will study below. Alternatively, mass producers may not
have an incentive to supply the low quality. This case is obviously not interest-
ing because there does not exist an incentive to undertake a process innovation
and the model essentially reduces to one of expanding product varieties.16
2.3.5 R&D and Resources
Inventing a new good and setting up a new exclusive firm is attractive as long
as the value of this product innovation (the present value of future cash flows)
does not fall short of the initial R&D cost. Initial R&D costs are w(t)F˜ (t) and,
taking labor as the numeraire so that w(t) = A(t), we have w(t)F˜ (t) = F . The
present value of a new innovation depends on whether and, if so, when the firm
implements the mass production technology. The process innovation costs are
w(t)G˜(t) = G. Denote by Δ(j) the duration between the product innovation
and the process innovation, i.e. the firm "age" at which to implement the mass
production technology; and by πe(j, t) and πm(j, t) the profits before and after
implementing mass production, respectively. Then the value of a firm that
introduces a new product at date τ is given by
V (j, τ) = max
Δ(j,τ)
[∫ τ+Δ(j)
τ
πe(j, t)e
−R(t,τ)dt+
∫ ∞
τ+Δ(j)
πm(j, t)e
−R(t,τ)dt−Ge−R(τ+Δ(j),τ)
]
,
With free entry into the R&D sector, the general equilibrium leaves no profit
opportunities unexploited. Hence the value of a product innovation cannot
exceed the initial R&D cost V (j, t) ≤ F .
Finally, the economy-wide resource constraint has to be satisfied at all times.
Aggregate labor supply is fixed to L. Aggregate labor demand comes from the
R&D sector and the production sector which produces (high- and low-quality)
output. In the R&D sector, N˙(t)F˜ (t) units of labor are engaged in designing
entirely new products, and M˙(t)G˜(t) units of labor are used to implement new
mass production technologies. In the production sector Yh(t)ah(t) and Yl(t)al(t)
16 In the dynamic context this means there is no incentive to undertake a process innovation
because the return to this investment is too low. An alternative polar case would be one
where firms have an extremely high incentive to undertake the process innovation because
process innovations are very cheap. In that case all firms would invest in both product and
process innovation right from the beginning, again reducing the framework to a situation of
expanding product varieties in which the high quality is never produced. See Appendix C.
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units of labor are employed to produce high-quality and low-quality output
denoted by Yh(t) and Yl(t), respectively. The resource constraint of the economy
can be written as
Yh(t)a˜h(t) + Yl(t)a˜l(t) + N˙(t)F˜ (t) + M˙(t)G˜(t) ≤ L.
2.4 General Equilibrium and Balanced Growth
We are now ready to consider the dynamic general equilibrium of the economy
described above. In the next sections we analyze the balanced growth path
and leave the analysis of transitional dynamics to section 7 below. In the bal-
anced growth equilibrium, there is both continuous introduction of entirely new
products and continuous adoption of new processes that allow mass production
of former exclusive goods. In the main text we focus on the most interesting
equilibrium situation where mass producers sell the high quality to the rich and
the low quality to the poor, i.e. where Assumption 1 holds. Situations where
Assumption 1 does not hold are analyzed in Appendix C.
Definition 1 A balanced growth equilibrium in our economy consists of a path
where the interest rate r(t) is constant; the stock of knowledge A(t), the wage
rate w(t), the total number of firms N(t), and the number of mass produc-
ers M(t) grow at the constant rate g. Hence the fraction of mass producers
m =M(t)/N(t) is constant and labor requirements a˜h(t), a˜l(t), F˜ (t), and G˜(t)
shrink at rate g. Profit maximizing prices pe(j, t), ph(j, t) and pl(j, t), and in-
stantaneous profits πe(j, t) and πm(j, t) are the same for all firms and constant
over time. Given Assumption 1, rich households consume all N(t) goods in
high quality and poor households consume all M(t) mass consumption goods in
low quality. Hence the level of consumption of rich cR(t) = qhN(t) and poor
cP (t) = qlM(t) also grows at rate g. Both types of households have the same
savings rate, so the distribution of wealth is stationary.
2.4.1 Product and Process Innovations
In a balanced growth equilibrium, the profits of exclusive and mass producers
are constant over time and given by πe and πm defined in Proposition 1 and
the interest rate r is constant. The optimal timing of the process innovation
simplifies to
max
Δ
∫ τ+Δ
τ
πee
−r(t−τ)dt+
∫ ∞
τ+Δ
πme
−r(t−τ)dt−Ge−rΔ.
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Using the Leibniz rule we obtain
Δ =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0
[0,∞)
∞
if (πm − πe)/r > G,
if (πm − πe)/r = G,
if (πm − πe)/r < G.
The above condition says that the present value of the increased profit flow
is compared to innovation costs. We are interested in an equilibrium outcome
where exclusive producers and mass producers co-exist so the first and third
case of the above condition can be ruled out. This means the optimal timing
of a process innovation Δ is undetermined. In other words firms are indifferent
whether and when to invest in process innovation. However, the aggregate frac-
tion of firms which have invested in process innovation, i.e. the fraction of mass
producers m, is determined in equilibrium. The indeterminacy of the individ-
ual product cycle is due to the symmetry in preferences and technology. The
symmetry assumption is not critical for our results. In fact, introducing asym-
metries in our basic framework generates deterministic product cycles featuring
the empirically observed patterns mentioned in Section 2. Section 6 analyzes
two such extensions.
Returning to the basic model, the following no-arbitrage conditions must
hold:
VN =
πe
r =
(1−β)L(qhμR−ah)
r = F,
VM =
(πm−πe)
r =
L[qlμP−(1−β)qlμR−βal]
r = G.
(2.3)
Note that, along the balanced growth path, all involved variables are constant
over time. The present value of the profit flow enabled by product innovation VN
must be equal to initial product R&D costs. And the present value of the incre-
mental profit flow enabled by subsequent process innovation VM must be equal
to process innovation costs. Note also that VN increases in the purchasing power
of the rich, while VM increases in the purchasing power of the poor. Higher in-
equality raises incentives for product innovation relative to process innovation,
while a more egalitarian society increases incentives for process innovation.
2.4.2 Growth and Mass Production
In a balanced growth equilibrium, expenditures grow at rate g and prices are
constant. Hence, consumption growth of poor and rich households follows the
standard Euler equation:
r = σg + ρ, (2.4)
Because poor households are endowed with θ units of labor and θv(t) units of
firm shares and rich households are endowed with (1−βθ)/(1−β) units of labor
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and [(1− βθ)/(1− β)] v(t) units of firm shares, a rich household receives an
income stream that is [(1− βθ)/(1− β)] /θ times as large as the one of a poor
household.17 The CES-specification of intertemporal preferences implies that
the flow of expenditures of a rich household compared to a poor on the balanced
growth path needs to be [(1− βθ)/(1− β)] /θ times as large, too. Recalling
that the mN(t) mass producers charge price ph for the high quality and pl for
the low quality and the (1−m)N(t) exclusive producers charge price pe, the
expenditure flow of a poor household is plmN(t) and the expenditure flow of a
rich household is [phm+ pe(1−m)]N(t). Hence, the ratio of the expenditure
flow of a rich relative to a poor household is
mph + (1−m)pe
mpl
=
1− βθ
(1− β)θ , (2.5)
where pe = qhμR, pl = qlμP , and ph = qlμP + (qh − ql)μR (see Proposition 1).
We can now characterize and analyze the balanced growth equilibrium using
two equations, a no-arbitrage curve and a resource curve. Using the no-arbitrage
conditions (2.3), we can express the price of the lower quality as
pl = qlμP = (1− β) [qlμR + (qhμR − ah)G/F ] + βal. (2.6)
Combining this with the above expression for relative expenditures (2.5) lets us
write the price of the exclusive good as
pe = qhμR = qh
alβ/(1− β)− ahG/F
θ (qh/m− ql) / (1− θ)− ql − qhG/F , (2.7)
from which we can infer ph = pl + (qh − ql)pe/qh. Plugging (2.7) into the no-
arbitrage condition of the exclusive producer and using the Euler equation (2.4)
yields the no-arbitrage curve (NA)
g =
1
σ
(
L
F
[
qh
βal − (1− β)ahG/F
θ (qh/m− ql) / (1− θ)− ql − qhG/F − (1− β)ah
]
− ρ
)
, (2.8)
which expresses the growth rate g in terms of the fraction of mass goods m. The
NA-curve is upward sloping in m if Fβal > G(1− β)ah and downward sloping
otherwise. Keeping g constant, the fraction of mass producers m rises in θ, and
17Here we stick to the simplifying assumption that the income composition of rich and poor
households is identical. As mentioned above, this is a special case that makes the analysis
simple and transparent. The more general (and more realistic) case when income composition
differs between rich and poor housholds does not add economic substance to the analysis.
However, in the next section, when we study transitional dynamics we need to give up this
assumption since the wealth distribution is no longer stationary.
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falls in β.18 This is because lower inequality raises the purchasing power of the
poor.
A second equation in m and g is derived from the aggregate resource con-
straint in the economy. Recall that along the balanced growth path the rich
consume all N(t) goods in high quality and the poor consume allM(t)mass con-
sumption goods in low quality. Hence, we can write L = (1−β)LN(t)ah/A(t)+
βLM(t)al/A(t) + N˙(t)F/A(t) + M˙(t)G/A(t). Using the equation of motion for
the aggregate stock of knowledge (2.1) and the definitions m =M(t)/N(t) and
g = N˙(t)/N(t) = M˙(t)/M(t) we can express the resource curve (RC) as
g =
L
[
(ψ + (1− ψ)mγ)1/γ − (1− β)ah − βalm
]
F +Gm
. (2.9)
Notice that the RC-curve may be upward or downward sloping. On the one
hand, there is a demand effect. An increase in m is associated with higher
consumption of the poor. Hence, more employment is needed to satisfy this
additional demand leaving fewer resources for research. On the other hand, there
is a productivity effect. An increase in m means that final output is produced in
a more efficient way which saves resources that become available for innovation
and growth. Under our specification for the evolution of the knowledge stock
(2.1), the productivity effect depends on the importance of process innovation
in pushing ahead the knowledge frontier. This is captured by the parameter
ψ. The lower is ψ, the more important are process innovations as drivers of
technical knowledge and the stronger is the productivity effect. Note also that
the distribution parameter θ does not enter the resource curve. The resource
curve shifts up when the population share of the poor β rises.
Proposition 1 A balanced growth equilibrium determined by the intersection
of the two curves (2.8) and (2.9) exists if Assumption 1 holds with strict in-
equalities.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The idea of the proof is the following: to determine whether the outcome
where mass producers separate households and exclusive producers sell only to
rich households is indeed an equilibrium, one needs to compute μR and μP using
the above equations for a given set of parameters, and test whether Assumption
1 holds with strict inequalities. If this is the case, no firm has an incentive to
18An increase in θ is offsetting an increase in m as the denominator in the NA-curve is
strictly increasing in θ given its derivative with respect to θ of (qh/m − ql)/(1 − θ)2 > 0.
Similar computations reveal that a decrease in β is offsetting an increase in m.
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deviate (see Proposition 1). Assumption 1 holds if the quality gap qh − ql is
sufficiently high (but not too high) relative to the cost gap ah − al and process
innovation costs G; and if inequality is sufficiently high, i.e. the group of poor
β is sufficiently large as well as the distribution parameter θ is not too high.
Conversely, a low quality gap would induce all firms to become mass producers
and supply only the low quality. Similarly, if the quality gap were too high,
there would be no incentive to invest in process innovations. These outcomes
are less interesting as the model essentially reduces to one of expanding product
varieties. When inequality is too low, a further outcome arises in which mass
producers sell the low quality to all households. We will characterize these other
outcomes in Appendix B in more detail. The existence of a positive growth
equilibrium is determined by comparing the horizontal m-axis intercepts of the
NA- and RC-curve (denoted by mNA and mRC). Assumption 1 guarantees
that the RC-curve (2.9) holds for g > 0 if m = 1. The equilibrium is unique if
mRC < mNA and the NA-curve is upward sloping since the NA-curve is convex
and the RC-curve is concave when upward sloping.19
2.5 Income Inequality and Technical Change
We will first analyze the equilibrium for the two polar cases of ψ = 1 when
knowledge spillovers are generated only by product innovations, and of ψ = 0
so that technical progress is driven only by process innovations.
2.5.1 Product Innovation as Driver of Productivity Growth
When product innovation is the only driver of productivity growth, we have
ψ = 1 and equation (2.1) becomes A(t) = N(t). While the no-arbitrage curve
(2.8) remains unchanged, the resource constraint simplifies to
g =
L [1− (1− β)ah − βalm]
F +Gm
. (2.10)
The resource curve is downward sloping in m, since a larger share of mass
producers requires more labor for manufacturing and process innovation, leaving
less labor for product R&D, the driver of growth.
19The condition mRC < mNA trivially holds if the RC-curve has a vertical axis intercept in
the positive (m, g)-quadrant, which is true whenever ψ1/γ > (1− β)ah. When mRC ≥ mNA
or the NA-curve is downward sloping, there may (but need not) be multiple balanced growth
equilibria. Apart from the locally stable steady state, there exists an intermediate unstable
steady state (and a stagnation equilibrium) in that case. See Appendix B.
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Figure 2.3: Impact of inequality in the case of ψ = 1
In the case of A(t) = N(t), inequality is beneficial for growth. A redistribu-
tion of income from the poor to the rich (reducing θ) leaves the resource curve
unchanged, but shifts the no-arbitrage curve to the left, as depicted in the left-
hand panel of Figure 2.3. A richer upper class has a higher willingness to pay
for products, and this price effect increases profits. Product inventions become
more attractive, spurring technical progress and growth. From a resource point
of view, redistributing wealth from the poor to the rich raises exclusion in the
economy, setting free resources from the manufacturing and the process R&D
sectors, which become available for product R&D, the driver of growth.
Increasing the size of the group of poor households β, while holding θ con-
stant, raises inequality (see section 3.1. above). As can be seen from the right-
hand panel of Figure 2.3, the resource curve shifts up and the no-arbitrage curve
shifts to the left. The reason is that a higher β is associated with higher in-
equality. (With θ given, relative incomes of rich households, (1− βθ) / [(1− β)θ],
increase). While there are less rich households reducing the market for the ex-
clusive goods, the (remaining) rich have a higher willingness to pay. It turns out
that the latter (price) effect dominates the former (market size) effect so profits
for exclusive producers increase for a given m and g. In the new equilibrium we
have fewer mass producers m which releases (manufacturing and process R&D)
resources which are channeled into product R&D, and hence growth g is higher.
In sum, higher inequality (either due to a lower θ or due to a higher β, or
both) is beneficial for growth, provided that growth is driven purely by product
innovations.
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Figure 2.4: Impact of inequality in the case of ψ = 0
2.5.2 Process Innovations as Productivity Drivers
The result that inequality is beneficial for growth hinges upon the assumption
that only product innovations affect productivity growth whereas process inno-
vation activities do not at all impact technical progress. We now consider the
other extreme, when ψ = 0, so that technical knowledge is entirely determined
by past process R&D activities, A(t) =M(t). The resource curve becomes
g =
L [1− (1− β)ah/m− βal]
F/m+G
, (2.11)
and is now upward sloping. As process innovation is the key to become a mass
producer, a higher share of mass production m is beneficial for growth. A
higher prevalence of mass production raises aggregate productivity. In contast
to before, a higher m implies less (low-productive) exclusive sectors which saves
resources for process R&D.
A higher extent of inequality due to lower incomes of poor households θ shifts
the no-arbitrage curve to the left, as depicted graphically in the left-hand panel
of Figure 2.4. The result is less mass production m and also a lower incentive
to undertake process innovations. Hence the growth rate g falls.
Increasing the group size of poor households β shifts the no-arbitrage curve
to the left and shifts the resource curve up, as shown in the right-hand panel
of Figure 2.4. The effect on growth is now ambiguous. When more income is
concentrated in the hands of fewer rich, there will be less mass consumption
m. This has two effects. On the one hand, the shift from mass consumption
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to exclusive markets decreases average productivity in manufacturing. On the
other hand, less mass production also implies that fewer resources are needed
for production which can be used for R&D and growth. Computations show
that either effect may dominate.
2.5.3 The General Case
Having analyzed the two polar cases, we have demonstrated that inequality may
be either beneficial or harmful for growth, depending on the source of technical
progress and productivity growth in the economy. Inequality has an effect on
prices and on the size of markets. On the one hand, a higher willingness to pay
of the rich households raises prices and profit margins, spurring entry and thus
product innovation. On the other hand, a high level of exclusion reduces mass
consumption markets, and thus incentives for process innovation.
The general case lies in between the two polar cases. Let us write down the
resource curve here as a function of m,
g(m) =
L
[
(ψ + (1− ψ)mγ)1/γ − (1− β)ah − βalm
]
F +Gm
,
The inequality-growth relationship depends on the slope of this function:
Proposition 2 Given Assumption 1, an increase in inequality due to a lower
relative income of poor consumers (lower θ) leads to a lower prevalence of mass
producers m. If the resource curve is (locally) decreasing in m, g′(m) < 0,
inequality raises growth. If it is increasing, inequality hurts growth.
We have shown above that for a given g, the fraction of mass producers
increases in θ. Hence m declines in inequality (given that θ does not enter the
resource curve directly), and the impact on growth depends on the slope of the
resource curve. In the cases of ψ = 1 and ψ = 0, we have shown that the
resource curve is (globally) downward and upward sloping, respectively. For
intermediate cases of ψ, where productivity growth is driven by both product
and process innovation, the sign of the inequality-growth relationship depends
on the dominating source of technical change and on the extent of inequality.
Under the assumption that the aggregate stock of knowledge evolves according
to (2.1), the marginal contribution of process innovations, ∂A(t)/∂M(t) is infi-
nite at m = 0, limm−>0 g′(m) = +∞. Hence, as long as ψ < 1, the RC curve
slopes upwards for low m. For larger values of m the resource curve eventually
becomes downward sloping. Intuitively, there are complementarities between
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product and process innovation. When an economy has invested relatively little
in process innovation, it is likely to benefit more from process innovations and
vice versa.
Taken together, for 0 < ψ < 1, the resource curve becomes hump-shaped as
depicted in Figure 2.5. Higher inequality fosters growth if inequality is initially
low (and the fraction of mass producers is high), whereas higher inequality slows
down growth if the extent of inequality is already high initially. Therefore, in a
very unequal society that is dominated by exclusive markets lowering inequality
is likely to increase growth. The expansion of mass consumption markets spurs
process innovation and increases growth. However, in a very egalitarian society,
the relationship may be reversed, when innovation incentives are based on a
better funded upper class, so that the introduction of new goods becomes more
attractive. As a result, both very high levels and very low levels of inequality
are harmful for growth. High long-run growth rates are reached by intermediate
degrees of inequality.
g
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Figure 2.5: Impact of inequality in the case of ψ ∈ (0, 1)
As noted above, both R&D sectors benefit equally from spillovers in our
basic setup. Spillovers could affect product and process innovations differently.
Suppose for example that there are only spillovers within (but not across) sectors
such that F˜ (t) = F/N(t), a˜h(t) = ah/N(t), G˜(t) = G/M(t), and a˜l(t) =
al/M(t). It is straightforward to verify from the resource curve that growth
does no longer depend on inequality in this case,
g =
L [1− (1− β)ah − βal]
F +G
.
However, as soon as there are some spillovers from one R&D sector to the
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other, the inequality-growth relationship depends on the relative strength of
product versus process innovation in expanding the technological frontier. In
the next section we will analyze an alternative technological specification with
learning-by-doing instead of intentional process innovations. We will see that the
inequality-growth relationship depends on the relative importance of learning-
by-doing effects. This analysis will demonstrate that our basic results and in-
tuitions do not rely on the specific way of modelling the externalities between
product and process innovations.
2.6 Product Cycles and Learning-by-doing
Given the symmetry in preferences and technology in our model, firms are in-
different about the timing of process innovation as discussed in the section on
R&D. The individual product cycle is indeterminate. There are two natural ex-
tensions to our model, either adjusting preferences or technology, which break
this symmetry and thus replicate the empirically observed product cycles. A
first extension models asymmetry into the technology of firms by introducing
learning-by-doing at the level of the individual firm. In the second extension
we relax the symmetry in preferences by introducing hierarchic preferences, a
fixed ranking of all varieties in the product space (by attaching unequal utility
weights to the various goods).
2.6.1 Learning-by-doing
Process innovation costs G(j, t) may differ across firms and decrease with in-
dividual manufacturing experience. Instead of modelling process innovation as
an intentional investment of G(j, t) depending on manufacturing experience,
it is instructive to analyze the case of process innovation as a pure (passive)
by-product of manufacturing,
a(j, t) = (1− Λ(j, t))a/N(t), Λ(j, t) =
∫ t
−∞
δx(j, s) exp(−δ(t− s))ds,
where δ is the speed of learning as well as the depreciation rate of learning
capital, and a(j, t) and x(j, s) productivity and production level of firm j (see
Matsuyama, 2002). For simplicity, let us assume that there is only one quality
level, q = 1. Individual productivity of a firm increases due to individual cu-
mulative manufacturing experience, as well as through spillovers from product
innovation. In equilibrium, mass consumption markets are more attractive for
higher productivity levels due to market size effects. Hence, firms start out
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exclusively producing for rich households, and eventually become producers for
the mass markets, after a fixed time interval Δ:
max
Δ
∫ Δ
0
(1−β)L [ph − (1− Λ(j, t))] exp(−rt)dt+
∫ ∞
Δ
L [pl − (1− Λ(j, t))] exp(−rt)dt = F/a,
where ph is the price charged by "exclusive producers", and pl by "mass produc-
ers", and we set w(t) = N(t)/a (numéraire). The maximized present value needs
to be equal to set-up costs, F˜ (t)w(t) = F/a (given spillovers F˜ (t) = F/N(t)),
generating a no-arbitrage condition. The optimal period of time Δ for being an
exclusive producer is determined by pl = (1−β)ph+β [1− L(1− β) [1− exp(−δΔ)]− δL/(r + δ)],20
and the fraction of mass producers by Δ:
m = 1−
∫ 0
−Δ
gN(0) exp(gt)dt/N(0) = exp(−gΔ).
The equilibrium can be analyzed by combining these equations with the Euler
equation (2.4) and the relative budget constraint, which in this case is ξ(m) =
((1−m)ph +mpl) /mpl, to form a no-arbitrage curve in m and g, as above.
The resource curve is determined by the resource constraint:
L = gF +
aL
N(t)
[∫ mN(t)
0
(1− Λ(j, t))dj + (1− β)
∫ N(t)
mN(t)
(1− Λ(j, t))dj
]
.
Our main conclusions remain unchanged. Computations show that the re-
source curve may be rising or falling inm, depending on the strength of learning-
by-doing (LBD). An increase in inequality, through a fall in θ, raises prices and
decreases mass consumption markets m, which tends to reduce resources re-
quired in manufacturing. However, by lowering aggregate manufacturing, LBD
in the economy is reduced. Either effect may dominate. Inequality and exclusion
lowers mass production and LBD. If LBD is the dominant driver of productivity
growth in the economy, inequality hurts growth.
The LBD formulation provides another demonstration of the close linkage of
process innovation and mass consumption markets. Process innovation may be
critical ex-ante to tap mass consumption markets, and is facilitated ex-post by
mass production through LBD. Tapping the mass consumption market creates
incentives for process innovation, while LBD, in turn, creates incentives to pur-
sue mass market strategies. Note that with the LBD formulation one does not
need spillovers from process on product innovations to generate a negative rela-
tionship between inequality and growth. As soon as LBD effects are sufficiently
20Use Leibniz rule and the fact that Λ(j, t) = L(1 − β) [1− exp(−δt)] if t ≤ Δt, and
Λ(j, t) = L [1− exp(−δt)]− βL [exp(−δ(t−Δt)− exp(−δt)] if t > Δt.
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strong, inequality lowers growth through reduced mass consumption markets.
Finally, one could also use the LBD formulation to model continuous improve-
ments in quality instead of cost-cutting. If experience in manufacturing enables
firms to produce higher quality levels instead of saving labor, inequality would
be beneficial for product innovation but harmful for quality improvements given
lower manufacturing levels.
2.6.2 Hierarchic Preferences
Suppose there is a hierarchy of needs as opposed to the symmetric preferences
of the main model. Certain more basic goods have priority:
u(t) =
∫ N(t)
0
ξ(j)x(j, t)q(j, t)dj,
where we have added a hierarchy weight ξ(j) to felicity which is strictly monoton-
ically decreasing in j. Hence low-j goods get a higher weight than high-j goods,
and thus households have a higher willingness to pay for low-j than for high-j
goods. Product innovation R&D would focus on the lowest-j goods not yet
invented. For balanced growth, the hierarchy weight needs to be a power func-
tion, ξ(j) = j−η (see Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimüller, 2006, Chapter 12). The
process innovation timing problem becomes:
max
Δ
V (j, t) =
∫ t+Δ
t
πe(j, s) exp(−rs)ds+
∫ ∞
t+Δ
πm(j, s) exp(−rs)ds−G exp(−rΔ),
πe(j, s) = L (1− β)
[
j−ηqhμR(s)− ah
]
,
πm(j, s) = L
[
β
(
j−ηqlμP (s)− al
)
+ (1− β) (j−η ((qh − ql)μR(s) + qlμP (s))− ah)] .
Profit flows depend on hierarchy levels and on time, as μR(t) and μP (t) are
increasing at rate ηg.21 Hence, the difference between profit flows from mass
and exclusive strategies grows.22 In equilibrium, firms start out being exclusive
producers. As the difference narrows to πm(j, s) − πe(j, s) = G, it becomes
optimal for firms to switch to mass strategies, Δ units of time after product
innovation (using Leibniz rule). The size makes low-j goods more attractive to
sell in mass consumption markets than high-j goods. Note that if we let η → 0,
21 In order that the no-arbitrage condition holds, the initial present value of every newly set
up firm must equal F . Hence the hierarchy-independent part of the willingness-to-pay μi(t)
must rise at −∂/∂t (j−η) = ηg over time, in order that the overall willingness to pay for a
good only depends on the time span since inception, and not on time.
22The revenues of mass producers must be higher in equilibrium. Otherwise, firms would
never switch to mass strategies given process innovation costs. Note also that both revenue
streams grow at the same rate. It follows that πm(j, s)− πe(j, s) grows over time.
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the hierarchic preferences formulation converges to the symmetric case of the
main text but with a determinate product cycle. If η is sufficiently high, instead,
the "innovate-and-wait" pattern arises (studied in Foellmi and Zweimüller, 2006)
where firms would innovate early to secure a patent on a low-j good and wait a
certain period of time before actually manufacturing the good as demand first
needs to mature sufficiently (initially in high quality, supplying it only to the
rich).
Hierarchic preferences generate a product cycle where firms initially sell
goods exclusively to rich households given their high willingness to pay for
new goods even if they are low on their priority list. After a certain period
of time, firms invest in process innovation to tap mass consumption markets as
their goods have climbed the relative hierarchic ladder, being transformed from
luxuries into necessities.
2.7 Transitional Dynamics
In our basic framework, both demand and supply shocks may trigger periods of
industrial change in which a series of process innovations increases production
and access to consumption markets, causing as Perkin (1969) put it "a revolution
in men’s access to means of life" (cited by Mokyr, 1999). In this section, we
undertake two thought experiments. In both cases we assume that the economy
is initially in an equilibrium that is characterized by low growth and low (or
complete absence of) mass production, and analyze exogenous shocks triggering
a process of transition toward a new steady state. In doing so, our analysis sheds
light on the process by which demand and/or supply shocks generate a take-up
of productivity growth and a transition of a society with high exclusion and low
consumer-participation of the lower classes to a mass consumption society.
The first thought experiment is a demand shock generated by a major drop
in inequality through an increase in θ. Assume that the economy is initially
in a steady state characterized by high inequality and low mass production so
that the initial balanced growth equilibrium is located on the upward sloping
branch of the resource curve (see Figure 2.5). As we have seen in the last sec-
tion, starting from such an equilibrium, a major drop in inequality leads to
a new balanced growth path with higher growth and a higher extent of mass
production. One potentially relevant situation from recent economic history
is the substantial drop in inequality during the Great Depression and WWII
that might help explain the boom in consumer durables in the U.S. of the
post-war era. The second thought experiment relates to a positive productivity
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shock lowering the costs of process innovation, G. Such a shock may trigger an
industrial revolution through which an initially stagnant economy of craftsman-
ship and high exclusion is transformed into an industrialized society with high
consumer-participation and growth.
The two state variables that characterize the transition process are the total
number of firms N(t) and the number of mass producers M(t). It turns out
that, when the economy operates along the balanced growth path both variables
grow pari passu. When the economy operates off this path, there are either only
product innovations or only process innovations but not both. We summarize
this result in
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and the economy features both
product and process innovations. Then the economy is on the balanced growth
path.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The proposition implies that, when the economy has too few mass producers
M(t), the transition process will be characterized by process innovations only.
Similarly, if there are too few exclusive producers N(t) −M(t), the transition
process will be characterized only by product innovations. Hence, all adjust-
ments in the state variable m(t) =M(t)/N(t) occur by a "bang-bang" rule. We
will also see that this implies that the transition from an old to a new steady
state will occur in finite time. This is partly driven by the assumption that A(t)
is common across product and process innovation so that the relative cost of the
two types of innovations never change. A phase in which one engine of growth
stops temporarily is not specific to our set-up. See Matsuyama (1999) for an-
other example where in one phase product variety expansion stops, while the
economy accumulates physical capital. In our framework, expansion of variety
stops while the economy accumulates process innovation. In fact, this transition
closely resembles the related work of directed technical change (see Proposition
1 of Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001), where only one type of innovation takes
place outside the balanced growth equilibrium. Alternatively, Galor and Moav
(2004, 2006) have developed models where in the early stages physical capi-
tal accumulation was the prime source of growth, while in latter stages human
capital emerged as growth engine.
2.7.1 A Major Drop in Inequality
An exogenous (and instantaneous) drop in inequality leads to transitional dy-
namics in our framework during which the fraction of firms that have invested in
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process innovation increases. One can think of the introduction of compulsory
schooling, increasing relative productivity of the poor, or an extreme event such
as a war lowering financial wealth inequality (such as during WWII), leading to
such an adjustment.
Initial and Final Balanced Growth Equilibrium
We assume that both in the initial and final balanced growth equilibrium condi-
tions are such that exclusive producers sell (their high quality) only to the rich;
and mass producers sell the high quality to rich and the low quality to poor
households. In contrast to the analysis of the last section, we need to relax the
assumption of identical endowment distributions. This is because the transition
process will be characterized by a situation where the two types of households
face different incentives to save and hence will accumulate wealth at unequal
speed. In other words, in the transition process, the wealth distribution is no
longer stationary invalidating the assumption θ = θv = θ. Instead we need
to account for the fact that θv(t) changes over time. We focus on the case of
log-utility, σ = 1, for simplicity.
The initial and final balanced growth paths are still characterized by the
equations from above, (2.3), (2.4), and (2.9). However, since θ may not be
equal to θv, equation (2.5) needs to be adjusted, as relative lifetime incomes
of rich households now depend on the factor income distribution, i.e. on wages
w(t) and firm values v(t). With a constant interest rate r and a constant growth
rate g, the present value of household i’s lifetime income (the right-hand-side
of the household i’s intertemporal budget constraint) equals w(t)i/ρ + vi(t).
By normalization, the wage is equal to w(t) = A(t) = N(t) (ψ + (1− ψ)mγ)1/γ
and, from the zero-profit conditions (2.3), we have v(t)L = N(t) (F +mG). As
the left-hand-side of a household’s intertemporal budget constraint is unaffected
by the more general specification of the endowment distributions, we can rewrite
equation (2.5) as
mph + (1−m)pe
mpl
= ξ(m), (2.12)
where relative lifetime incomes ξ(m) are now given by
ξ(m) ≡ ρ(1− βθv)(F +mG) + (1− βθ)L (ψ + (1− ψ)m
γ)
1/γ
ρ(1− β)θv(F +mG) + (1− β)θL (ψ + (1− ψ)mγ)1/γ
,
with ξm(m) > 0 since (θv, θ) < (1, 1). Note also that ξ(m) decreases in both
θv and θ.
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We can solve this more general case in a similar way as above. First calcu-
late pe = qhμR using equation (2.12) and no-arbitrage conditions (2.3). Then
plug the resulting expression into the no-arbitrage condition for the exclusive
producer to get a new no-arbitrage curve (2.8)
g =
L(1− β)
F
[
qh
βal − (1− β)ahG/F
(qh/m− ql) / (ξ(m)− 1)− (1− β) (ql + qhG/F ) − ah
]
− ρ,
(2.13)
For a given growth rate g, raising θv or θ increases m, since ξ(m) is increasing
in m as well as decreasing in θv and θ. Lowering financial wealth or labor
income inequality reduces exclusion. Hence, in much the same way as above,
the inequality-growth relationship depends on the slope of the resource curve.
Transition
Now consider a mean-preserving spread in the endowment distributions raising
incomes of poor households at the expense of the rich, so that (θ′v(t0), θ
′
) >
(θv, θ), in a balanced growth equilibrium at time t = t0. Imagine that the in-
troduction of compulsory schooling increases relative productivity of the poor,23
θ′ > θ, or shares in firms are redistributed (e.g. during a war) from rich to
poor, θ′v(t0) > θv.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the transitional dynamics triggered by a drop in in-
equality. As a result of the shift in purchasing power, poor households increase
consumption whereas the consumption of rich households initially stagnates.
Since the economy has too few mass producers M(t), demand for the mass
production technology is high, and all R&D resources are temporarily directed
towards process innovation. The economy reaches the new steady state in finite
time at t = t2 when product innovations become attractive again. The figure is
drawn in such a way that growth is higher in the final state, which is the case
if inequality is sufficiently high in the initial state such that the resource curve
is upward sloping (g′(m) < 0 see Proposition 3). The following proposition
characterizes the transition process in detail:
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 holds at all times. a) A fall in inequal-
ity at date t0, from (θv, θ) to (θ
′
v(t0), θ
′
), triggers a transition period of finite
23 Strictly speaking, introducing/increasing compulsory schooling leads to a more equal en-
dowment distribution by changing not only the spread but also the mean of the labor endow-
ment distribution. It is straightforward to see that an increase in L increases growth because
the model exhibits a scale effect. Here our focus are distributional consequences, hence we
consider mean-preserving spreads.
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Figure 2.6: Drop in inequality
duration (t0, t2) where N˙(t) = 0 and M˙(t) > 0. A new balanced growth equilib-
rium with m′ > m is reached at date t2. b) During the entire transition period
consumption of the rich stagnates at cR(t) = qhN(t0). c) When the initial re-
duction in inequality is substantial, cP (t) jumps to a higher level at date t0.
During a first transition period, t ∈ [t0, t1), cP (t) > qlM(t); during a second
transition period, t ∈ [t1, t2), cP (t) = qlM(t). When the initial reduction in
inequality is minor, cP (t) does not change discontinuously at date t0, the first
transition period does not exist and cP (t) = qlM(t) for all t > t0.
See Appendix D for the technical details including a description of the pro-
cedure of numerical simulations. If Assumption 1 holds for both (θv, θ) and
(θ′v, θ
′
), the balanced growth equilibrium before and after the transition corre-
sponds to a situation where exclusive producers sell (their high quality) only to
the rich and the mass producers sell the high quality to the rich and the low
quality to the poor. A redistribution from top to bottom has two key effects.
First, there is an effect on the direction of technical change as only process but
no product innovations occur during transition. Redistributing income towards
the poor raises their purchasing power and their willingness to pay relative to the
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one of the rich. Consequently, process innovations become temporarily strictly
more attractive than product invention and all R&D activities are concentrated
on the implementation of mass production technologies. During this period
interest rates are constant and given by
r1G =
[
ql
qh
− al
ah
]
Lβah. (2.14)
The right-hand side is the incremental profit flow from a mass separating strat-
egy, which must be equal to the current interest rate times the investment for
process innovation.24
The second effect concerns the price setting behavior of exclusive producers.
If the drop in inequality is substantial, it becomes attractive for exclusive pro-
ducers to exploit the higher willingness to pay of the poor. An (endogenous)
fraction of exclusive producers will set a price that equals the willingness to pay
of the poor and sell temporarily to all households; and the remaining fraction of
exclusive producers will still sell only to the rich at a price equal to their (high)
willingness to pay.25 During the first transition period t ∈ (t0, t1) exclusive pro-
ducers are indifferent between setting a low price and selling to all households
and setting a high price and selling only to the rich, i.e. we must have
L (qhμP (t)− ah) = L(1− β) (qhμR(t)− ah) . (2.15)
It is also interesting to look at optimal consumption choices during tran-
sition. We need to adjust the Euler equation for the rich. Recall that con-
sumption expenditures are qhμR(t)N(t) and, since in transition N˙(t)/N(t) = 0,
consumption expenditures grow at rate μ˙R(t)/μR(t). The Euler equation there-
fore determines the growth rate of the willingness to pay of the rich
μ˙R(t)
μR(t)
= r1 − ρ. (2.16)
When the drop in inequality is substantial, poor households’ consumption ex-
penditures in the first transition period are μP (t)cP (t) where cP (t) is the con-
24We have used condition (2.15) to eliminate the willingness-to-pay of rich and poor in the
incremental profit flow, L (qlμP (t)− (1− β)qlμR(t)− βal). The flow must be equal to r1G
since VP (t) = G and thus V˙P (t) = 0.
25The fraction of exclusive producers that sell to all households depends on the extent to
which the consumer budget of the poor exceeds the spending on mass consumption goods.
In the transition, as the fraction of mass producers increases the share of exclusive producers
that sell to all households decreases. By date t1 the number of firms that have adopted mass
production has increased sufficiently so that the optimal spending of the poor exactly coincides
with spending on mass consumption goods only.
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sumption aggregator for the poor households (see section 3.3). The Euler equa-
tion of a poor household therefore is
μ˙P (t)
μP (t)
+
c˙P (t)
cP (t)
= r1 − ρ. (2.17)
Because (2.15) must hold during the first transition phase, it must be that μP (t)
increases at a smaller rate than r1−ρ.26 Consequently, c˙P (t)/cP (t) > 0. Denote
by NP (t) the number of goods that the poor can afford. During the first period
of transition we have NP (t) > M(t) and cP (t) = qlM(t) + qh(NP (t) −M(t)).
Since M(t) grows faster than NP (t), there is a date t = t1 where we have
reached M(t1) = NP (t1). From date t1 onwards we have cP (t) = qlM(t). The
equal-profit condition (2.15) does not hold anymore and exclusive producers
are strictly better off selling only to the rich. μR(t) continues to grow at rate
r(t) − ρ, but μP (t) grows more slowly. Interest rates are no longer constant,
but still determined by incremental profit flows and investment costs for process
innovation.
The final law of motion comes from the resource constraint. Recalling that
in the entire transition period we have N˙(t) = 0 and N(t) = N(t0) we can write
M˙(t)G/L = A(N(t0),M(t))−β [M(t)al + (NP (t)−M(t))ah]− (1−β)N(t0)ah.
(2.18)
Moreover, we have initial conditions M(t0) = mN(t0) and N(t0), and transver-
sality conditions for rich and poor households. At date t2, the economy reaches
the new balanced growth equilibrium with m(t) = m′ in finite time as soon as
product innovation becomes attractive again, r(t)F = L(1− β)(qhμR(t)− ah).
In summary, a substantial drop in inequality may trigger a period of in-
dustrial change where innovation activity is purely directed towards process
innovation. Such a transition could have been triggered by the substantial drop
in inequality during the Great Depression and WWII, helping to explain the
boom in consumer durables in the U.S. in the post-war era. Note that in the
opposite case of a decrease in (θv, θ), raising inequality, one can show that
innovation is purely directed to product innovation during the transition.
2.7.2 Positive Productivity Shock
Process innovations, such as the introduction of assembly lines, play an im-
portant role in the emergence of modern mass consumption markets. In this
26>From (2.15) it is straighforward to calculate μ˙P (t)/μP (t) =
[(1− β)μ˙R(t) + βah] / [(1− β)μR(t) + βah] < μ˙R(t)/μR(t) = r1 − ρ
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subsection we study an economy in a stagnant/low-growth state where process
innovation initially is too expensive or not available at all (G prohibitively high).
If a positive productivity shock lowers G sufficiently, the economy experiences a
takeoff, transforming a stagnant (or low-growth) highly exclusive economy into
an economy with high consumer-participation and growth. One needs the re-
striction of γ > 0 in order to have sustained growth in the initial stage without
any experience in process innovation (so that product and process innovations
are not too complementary).
Initial Exlusive Stage
Suppose that, initially, the economy is characterized by a balanced growth equi-
librium where process innovations are absent altogether. More precisely, as-
sume initially G is too high to make process innovations sufficiently attrac-
tive. In such a steady state the economy invests only in product innova-
tions. Active firms do not have access to the mass production technology.
(Think of the high quality as goods produced by craftsmen. The poor house-
holds can only afford a very limited subset of these expensive, hand-crafted
goods, e.g. one set of furniture which holds for a lifetime or one tailored suit.)
Hence, the initial equilibrium is characterized by a situation where a fraction
nP = NP (t)/N(t) of producers serve the entire customer base at price qhμP
and a fraction 1 − nP = (N(t) − NP (t))/N(t) sells their product only to the
rich at price qhμR. Lifetime income of houshold i still is w(t)i/ρ+ vi(t). How-
ever, since the (initial) balanced growth equilibrium features m = 0, we have
w(t) = A(t) = N(t)ψ1/γ and v(t)L = N(t)F . The relative budget constraint of
a rich to a poor household (2.5) now becomes
(1− nP )μR + nPμP
nPμP
= ξ(0) ≡ ρ(1− βθv)F + (1− βθ)Lψ
1/γ
ρ(1− β)θvF + (1− β)θLψ1/γ
,
the no-arbitrage curve reads
g =
L(1− β)
F
[
βah
(1/nP − 1) / (ξ(0)− 1)− (1− β) − ah
]
− ρ,
and the resource curve
g =
L[ψ1/γ − (1− β + nPβ)ah]
F
.
In this initial stage, the long-run growth performance of the economy is
weak because technical progress is only fueled by product R&D whereas process
R&D projects are not undertaken at all. As a result manufacturing acitivities
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and product invention is relatively unproductive (high F˜ (t) and a˜h(t)). In this
initial stage, raising inequality clearly is beneficial for growth as higher exclusion
frees up resources for product R&D.
Transition
Consider an exogenous positive productivity shock, G′ < G, lowering investment
costs of process innovations sufficiently such that
rG′ <
[
ql
qh
− al
ah
]
Lβah < rG. (2.19)
The incremental profit flow of having implemented process innovation must
be greater than prevailing interest rates times the investment amount, G′.27
Process innovations become attractive once productivity gains, al/ah, suffi-
ciently outweigh quality discounts, ql/qh. Such a positive supply shock triggers
an industrial revolution in which a series of process innovation transforms the
initial exclusive society into a modern mass consumption society.
Figure 2.7 displays the evolution of the economy around the transition from
an exclusive to a mass consumption society. After the economy experiences
a positive productivity shock lowering G at time t0, product innovation tem-
porarily halts as firms focus on innovating their manufacturing processes. In this
phase, consumption of the rich stagnates, whereas the product range of the poor
grows as they shift their consumption towards goods at lower prices and quality
once available. After all mass producers have innovated their manufacturing
process, product invention activities resume once the economy reaches the new
balanced growth equilibrium with higher growth and lower exclusion in finite
time. The transition process resembles the one following a shift in inequality
from above (see Appendix D):
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 1 holds after the shock: a) A substantial
drop in process innovation costs, G′ < G, at t = t0 such that condition (2.19)
holds, triggers a transition of finite duration t ∈ (t0, t2) with N˙(t) = 0 and
M˙(t) > 0. From t2 onwards, the economy is in a new steady state with m > 0. b)
Consumption of the rich stagnates at cR(t) = qhN(t0) during the entire transi-
tion. c) Consumption of the poor jumps to cP (t0) = qhNP (t0) at date t0. During
a first phase of the transition, t ∈ (t0, t1), cP (t) = qlM(t) + qh(NP (t) −M(t))
27 Similarly to the first example of a transition, we have used condition (2.4)
to eliminate the willingness-to-pay of rich and poor in the additional profit flow,
L (qlμP (t)− (1− β)qlμR(t)− βal), which initially must hold.
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Figure 2.7: Positive productivity shock
grows at a rate lower than M˙(t)/M(t). During a second phase of transition
t ∈ (t1, t2), cP (t) and M(t) grow pari passu.
If poor households immediately stopped consuming higher quality goods,
consumption of the poor would need to drop to zero, since immediately after
the shock no firm is able to offer the low quality yet. This cannot be the case
due to infinite marginal utility at zero consumption. Hence, there is an initial
phase with M(t) < NP (t) corresponding to the initial phase following a drop in
inequality, characterized by the dynamic system (2.15)-(2.18) with initial condi-
tions M(t0) = 0 and N(t0) > 0, and transversality conditions. During the first
phase t ∈ (t0, t1) poor households purchase both high-quality goods produced
with the inefficient technology and low-quality goods produced with the new
mass production technology. From date t1 onwards, only firms that have made
the process innovation sell to the poor. In this second transition phase all R&D
activity still consists of process innovation and only when the new balanced
growth level of m = M(t)/N(t) has been reached, firms start developing new
products. Given the stagnant consumption of rich households, N˙(t) = 0, prices
for exclusive goods increase relative to mass goods until product innovation be-
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comes attractive again, and the economy reaches the new balanced growth equi-
librium, corresponding to the one of Proposition 2 with Assumption 1 holding.
Growth is higher in the new balanced growth equilibrium if process innovation
is sufficiently important for technical progress and productivity growth (if ψ
and γ are not too high).
Process innovations are able to transform the initial stagnant/low-growth
economy burdened by high exclusion into a modern mass consumption society
characterized by significantly higher growth and lower exclusion. Notice that
our results are quite different from those in Matsuyama (2002) who also studies
the transition to a mass consumption society. In contrast to the learning-by-
doing formulation of Matsuyama, where competitive firms experience technical
progress due to past production experience, in our case intentional innovation
activities drive the adoption of mass production technologies and the introduc-
tion of mass consumption goods. Hence, under certain parameter values, our
analysis may feature a situation where, in the initial exclusive society, inequal-
ity is unambiguously beneficial for growth, while after the transition to a new
steady state, the inequality-growth relationship may be turned upside down.
Once mass production technologies break even, a more egalitarian society in-
creases mass consumption markets fostering process innovation and brings the
economy on a steeper long-run growth path.
2.8 Conclusion
In this essay we presented an endogenous growth model where firms invest both
in product and process innovations. Product innovations (that open up com-
pletely new product lines) satisfy the luxurious wants of the rich. Subsequent
process innovations (that decrease costs per unit of quality) transform the luxu-
rious products of the rich into conveniences of the poor. A prototypical example
for such a product cycle is the automobile. Initially an exclusive product for
the very rich, the automobile became affordable to the middle class after the
introduction of Ford’s Model T, the car that "put America on wheels". We
argue that recent economic history is full of examples where consumer durables
followed a similar product cycle.
Our analysis shows that the extent of economic inequality in a society gen-
erates substantially different incentives for product and process innovation. An
egalitarian society creates strong incentives to adopt mass production technolo-
gies that allow the production of low-quality low-cost versions of existing luxu-
ries (such as Model T). In contrast, an unequal society creates strong incentives
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for product innovations (new luxuries). Depending on which type of innovative
activity drives technical progress, economic inequality is harmful or beneficial for
long-run growth. This distinct role of product and process innovations goes in
an important way beyond standard R&D based growth models, in which process
innovations and product inventions are often mathematically similar (Acemoglu,
2009). To investigate the role of income inequality, one must deviate from the
standard homothetic preferences. If the wealthy upper class consumes both
more and better goods than the large majority of poorer households, in line
with both casual observation and empirical evidence, inequality shapes product
markets and thus relative incentives for product versus process innovation.
While our basic framework determines the extent of mass production, indi-
vidual product cycles are indeterminate. We proposed two natural extensions
to get rid of this indeterminacy and incorporate deterministic product cycles in
our analysis. A first extension is learning-by-doing where production experience
lets production costs fall over time. Goods that are introduced earlier can be
produced at lower cost, increasing innovators’ incentive to open up mass mar-
kets. A second extension are hierarchic preferences where goods can be ranked
according to priority in consumption (i.e. yield asymmetric utilities). Product
innovations follow the consumption hierarchy in the sense that product R&D
expenditures are directed towards (not yet invented) goods with highest prior-
ity and process innovations are undertaken when the incomes of the poor have
sufficiently increased. Both extensions generate a deterministic cycle with an
initial phase of exclusion (only the rich can afford the new product) followed
by the phase of mass consumption. Furthermore, our framework is sufficiently
simple and tractable so that we can characterize not only balanced growth paths
but also transition processes. Studying transitional dynamics is not only inter-
esting from a methodological point of view but is relevant to better understand
episodes in recent economic history. For instance, our analysis has shown that
a major redistribution of economic resources such as the fall in U.S. income
inequality between the Great Depression and WWII may help to explain the
post-war boom in consumer durables. Our analysis shows that a demand shock
arising from a major income redistribution temporarily generates very strong
incentives for process innovations and the introduction of mass consumption
goods. Similarly, major technological inventions, such as the assembly line, also
give temporary strong incentives to implement mass production technologies so
that existing sectors — one after the other — adopt mass production technologies,
leading to a trickle-down process from which the poor benefit disproportionately.
For the sake of simplicity and tractability, our model reduced the income
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distribution to two groups of households. A more general income distribution
would smooth the product cycle with penetration levels following logistic En-
gel curves in the aggregate (rather than a jump as in the stylized case of two
groups of consumers). A new producer would start out serving only the richest
households and then, by setting lower prices, expand the market step-by-step
(in the case of a discrete number of distinct groups) or continuously (in the
case of a continuous endowment distribution). Once a certain "cut-off" date
has been reached, the producer would invest in process innovation. However,
apart from generating more realistic dynamics of product penetration, such a
generalization — while substantially complicating the formal analysis — would
add little additional economic insight to the model.
As discussed above, our model has abstracted from continuous quality im-
provements of existing goods. It was assumed that quality adjustments occur
only once — when the process innovation is made and the mass production
technology together with a low-quality version of an existing luxury good is
implemented. However, continuous quality improvements both of luxuries and
mass consumption goods are important features of reality. Our model could be
easily adapted to account for exogenous quality increases. If qh and ql increased
at an exogenous rate, all features of our model would remain the same. At a
more general level, understanding how the quality upgrading of existing prod-
ucts interacts with the degree of inequality in society is an interesting direction
of research and is the topic of the next chapter.
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2.10 Appendix
Appendix A (Chapter 2): Proof of Proposition 1
Taking labor as the numeraire so that w(t) = A(t), we can rewrite marginal
costs w(t)a˜k(t) = ak for k ∈ {l, h} given spillovers. A mass producer selling the
high quality to the rich and the low quality to the poor faces the following profit
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maximization problem:
max
ph,pl
[L(1− β)(ph − ah) + Lβ(pl − al)] ,
s.t. (i) ph ≤ qhμR, (ii) pl ≤ qlμP , (iii) qhμR − ph ≥ qlμR − pl, and (iv) qlμP − pl ≥ qhμP − ph,
The constraints are based on the first-order conditions of households (2.2). (i)
and (ii) ensure that households purchase the good (rationality constraints), and
(iii) and (iv) ensure that rich households prefer to buy the high quality and poor
the low (incentive constraints). Notice that a firm cannot separate the rich into
the low quality and the poor into the high given the higher willingness to pay
of the rich, μR > μP .
28
Constraint (iii) and μR > μP imply qhμR − ph ≥ qlμR − pl > qlμP −
pl. Hence if constraint (ii) were inactive, so would be (i). But then the firm
could increase both prices by the same amount without violating (iii) and (iv).
Hence constraint (ii) must be active, qhμR − ph ≥ qlμR − pl > qlμP − pl = 0,
which implies that constraint (iii) must be active, too. Otherwise the firm could
increase the price of the high quality without violating constraints (iii) and
(i). Since constraint (iii) is active, qhμR − ph = qlμR − pl > qlμP − pl = 0,
constraint (i) cannot be active. Rewritting the active constraint (iii), ph − pl =
qhμR − qlμR > qhμP − qlμP shows that constraint (iv) is not active as well.
Hence constaints (ii) and (iii) are active, pl = qlμP and qhμR − ph = qlμR − pl,
and a separating mass producer optimally sets prices pl = qlμP and ph =
qlμP + (qh − ql)μR.
Recall that a mass producer has four other options besides separating the
rich into the high quality and the poor into the low (h, l): sell the high quality
only to rich (h, 0) or to all households (h, h), or sell the low quality only to rich
(l, 0) or to all households (l, l). The five options yield the following profit flows:
πh,0 = L(1− β)(qhμR − ah),
πh,h = L(qhμP − ah),
πh,l = Lβ(qlμP − al) + L(1− β)((qh − ql)μR + qlμP − ah), (2.20)
πl,l = L(qlμP − al),
πl,0 = L(1− β)(qlμR − al).
It is easy to verify that if Assumption 1 holds, separating households (h, l) is an
optimal strategy for mass producers. Condition (i) (qh − ql)μR > ah−al ensures
28 Incentive constraints of qlμR − pl ≥ qhμR − ph and qhμP − ph ≥ qlμP − pl would require
(qh − ql)μP ≥ ph − pl ≥ (qh − ql)μR, which cannot hold.
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that selling the low quality to all households (l, l) yields lower profits. Condition
(iii) qlμP − (1− β) qlμR − βal ≥ 0 ensures that selling only the high quality to
rich households (h, 0) yields equal or lower profits. And since condition (ii)
(1− β) (qhμR − ah) ≥ (qhμP − ah) ensures that exclusive producers (weakly)
prefer selling the high quality only to rich households instead to all, selling
the high quality to all households (h, h) must generate lower profits for mass
producers, as well. And finally, condition (i) also ensures that selling the low
quality only to rich households (l, 0) is inferior (to selling the high quality only
to rich households and thus to separating households). Similarly for exclusive
producers which can only supply the high quality, condition (ii) ensures that
selling only to rich households is an optimal strategy.
If conditions (ii) and (iii) in Assumption 1 hold with strict inequality, exclu-
sive producers sell only to the rich generating πe = πh,0, and mass producers
separate households generating πm = πh,l, proofing part (a) of Proposition 1.
When condition (ii) holds with equality, exclusive firms are indifferent between
selling only to rich and to all households, πe = πh,0 = πh,h, proofing part (b).
And when condition (iii) holds with equality, mass producers are indifferent be-
tween selling only to rich and selling to all, separating households, πm = πe,
proofing part (c).
If Assumption 1 does not hold, it might be more profitable for exclusive
producers to sell the high quality to all households and/or for mass producers
to sell only one quality either only to rich or to all households. Appendix B takes
into account the general equilibrium to say more about the different outcomes.
Appendix B (Chapter 2): Proof of Proposition 2
In a first step we prove the following lemma stating the possible equilibrium
outcomes:
Lemma 1 In a balanced growth equilibrium, four outcomes are possible: (1)
some firms sell the high quality only to rich while others the high quality to rich
and the low quality to poor, (2) some firms sell the high quality only to rich
while others the low quality to all, (3) all firms only sell the high quality, some
only to rich while others to all, and (4) all firms only sell the low quality, some
only to rich while others to all.
Proof. In any equilibrium, among the five options of firms (see Appendix
A), two are equilibrium strategies: some firms sell to all households since other-
wise poor households would consume nothing, and some firms sell only to rich
48 CHAPTER 2. THE MACROECONOMICS OF MODEL T
households.29 This leaves six combinations of two strategies of which two can
be ruled out:
Compare profit flows (equations 2.20) to see that ”(qh−ql)μP > ah−al” =⇒
”πh,h > πl,l”, ”(qh − ql)μR > ah − al” =⇒ ”πh,0 > πl,0” and ”(qh − ql)μR >
ah − al” =⇒ ”πh,l > πl,l”. Since μR > μP , we have ”πh,h ≥ πl,l” =⇒ ”πh,0 >
πl,0”, ”πl,0 ≥ πh,0” =⇒ ”πl,l > πh,h”, and ”πh,0 > πl,0” ⇐⇒ ”πh,l > πl,l”.
Hence we can rule out outcomes where some firms separate and other firms
sell the low quality only to rich households. We can also rule out outcomes
where some firms sell the high quality to all households and other firms the
low quality only to rich households, which require πl,0 − πh,0 ≥ πl,l − πh,h,
implying (qh − ql)μP [1/β − (1− β)μP /β/μR] ≥ ah − al. But from above we
know that ”πl,0 ≥ πh,0” =⇒ ”πl,l > πh,h”, implying (qh − ql)μP < ah − al,
which contradicts the inequality in the previous sentence, since the term in the
square bracket is smaller than one (μR > μP , and β < 1).
Note that in any balanced growth equilibrium one of the four outcomes
prevails. On transitional equilibrium paths we have shown that, if m(t) is too
low, three strategies co-exist for general parameter values. Focusing on balanced
growth paths, let us characterize these four outcomes in more detail starting
with the one of the main text proofing Proposition 2.
A balanced growth equilibrium determined by (2.8) and (2.9) exists if As-
sumption 1 holds with strict inequalities. From Proposition 1 we know that ex-
clusive producers sell only to the rich and mass producers separate households
if Assumption 1 holds with strict inequalities. Hence one needs to compute μR
and μP for a given set of parameters, using equations (2.8) and (2.9) and the
expressions for prices of Section 4.3, and test whether Assumption 1 holds. If
this is the case, no firm has an incentive to deviate, and the outcome is indeed
an equilibrium.30 Computations have shown that Assumption 1 holds in a bal-
anced growth equilibrium if the quality gap qh − ql is sufficiently high relative
to the cost gap ah − al and process innovation costs G; and if inequality is suf-
ficiently high, i.e. the group of poor β is sufficiently large as well as θ not too
high. If Assumption 1 is violated, alternative outcomes prevail (see below).
29Firms which sell to all households cannot charge the entire willingness to pay of the rich
(even when separating households they need to leave an "informational rent" to incentivize rich
households to buy the high quality). Hence rich would have no binding first-order condition
(i.e. would not exhaust their budgets) if all firms sold to all households. We can rule out such
equilibrium outcomes, since rich households would have an infinite willingness to pay and thus
firms would have an incentive to sell only to rich households instead.
30Furthermore, one can show that the equilibrium is unique by checking that firms have
incentives to deviate in every alternative equilibrium outcome (see below).
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In order to determine existence of a positive growth equilibrium, denote the
horizontal m-axis intercepts of the NA- and RC-curve as mNA and mRC . If
mRC < mNA a positive balanced growth equilibrium must exist. The left hand
side of (2.9) is increasing in ψ for m < 1. Hence, the RC-curve shifts downwards
when ψ decreases. Thus, mRC |ψ>0 < mRC |ψ=0 = (1 − β)ah/ (1− βal), by
using (2.9). Since (1 − β)ah/ (1− βal) < 1 (otherwise RC and NA could not
cross at m < 1 for ψ = 0 thereby violating assumption 1), the RC-curve (2.9)
is fulfilled for g > 0 if m = 1. We derive a sufficient condition for mRC < mNA
(1− β)ah/ (1− βal) <
θ (ql/qh + (1− θ)G/F + (1− θ) [βal − (1− β)ahG/F ] / [ρF/L+ (1− β)ah])−1 = mNA.
Note further that the condition mRC < mNA trivially holds if the RC-curve has
a vertical axis intercept in the positive (m, g)-quadrant, which is true whenever
ψ1/γ > (1− β)ah.
The balanced growth equilibrium is necessarily unique if the NA-curve is
upward sloping (which holds true if alβ/(1 − β) > ahG/F ). The NA-curve is
always convex in m. To see this, note that
∂2qhμR/∂m
2 = 2ζ(1− θ) [alβ/(1− β)− ahG/F ] [θ/m− ζ]−3 > 0
with ζ ≡ ql/qh+(1−θ)G/F . The definition of (2.7) requires that the nominator
and the denominator have the same sign such that qhμR > 0. The RC-curve
is concave when it is upward sloping, this holds true as (ψ + (1− ψ)mγ)1/γ
is a concave function. Hence, the curves can cross only once in only once in
the positive (m, g)-quadrant as long as the horizontal m-axis intercept of an
upward sloping NA-curve lies to the right of the RC-curve. For mRC ≥ mNA or
a downward sloping NA-curve, a positive growth equilibrium exists as well but
it is not necessarily unique.
Appendix C (Chapter 2): Alternative Equilibrium Outcomes
When one of the conditions in Assumption 1 is violated, alternative outcomes
will arise. We briefly discuss these outcomes. First, mass producers may supply
only the low quality to both poor and rich households while exclusive producers
sell only to the rich. Along the lines of the main text, we can derive prices, a
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no-arbitrage curve and a resource curve, respectively, for such an outcome,
pl = qlμP = (1 +G/F )(1− β) (qhμR − ah) + al,
pe = qhμR =
al − (1 +G/F )(1− β)ah
(1/m− 1) / (ξ(m)− 1)− (1− β)(1 +G/F ) ,
g =
L(1− β)
F
[
al − (1 +G/F )(1− β)ah
(1/m− 1) / (ξ(m)− 1)− (1− β)(1 +G/F ) − ah
]
− ρ,
g =
L
[
(ψ + (1− ψ)mγ)1/γ − (1−m)(1− β)ah −mal
]
F +Gm
.
This outcome is qualitatively similar to the one we focus on with one difference:
Even in the case of A(t) = N(t), i.e. ψ = 1, inequality may be harmful for
growth. For a sufficiently small al, the resource curve may be increasing in
m. An increase in the fraction of mass producers m may set free resources
for product R&D, as mass producers only use the less laborious process. Even
though more goods are produced, less production labor is needed. If al is not
sufficiently small, the results are analogous to the main text. The conditions for
this case are that exclusive producers prefer selling only to rich, (1−β)(qhμR−
ah) > (qhμP − ah), and mass producers prefer selling the low quality to all
households, ah − al > (qh − ql)μR and (qlμP − al) > (1− β)(qlμR − al).
Second, if process innovation costs are too high, no firm invests in mass pro-
duction and firms either sell to rich or to all households. Such an outcome corre-
sponds to the initial stage in Section 6.2, and the equilibrium is characterized by
the equations presented there. Recall that in this equilibrium outcome, inequal-
ity unambiguously is beneficial for growth as the resource curve is downward
sloping in nP given the absence of process innovation. Process innovation costs
are too high if G > max(πh,l/ (g + ρ)− F, πl,l/ (g + ρ)− F, πl,0/ (g + ρ)− F ).
Third, the last outcome arises in the opposite case where the mass production
technology is too attractive. The resulting outcome is qualitatively equivalent to
the previous one (initial stage in Section 6.2), substituting (F +G, al, ql, ξ(0), 1)
for
(
F, ah, qh, ξ(1), ψ
1/γ
)
, and arises if F > max(πh,0/ (g + ρ) , πh,h/ (g + ρ))
and ah − al > (qh − ql)μR, that is if process innovation costs G are sufficiently
low, and the quality gap qh− ql relatively low compared to the cost gap ah−al.
Also in this equilibrium outcome, inequality is unambiguously beneficial for
growth as the resource curve is downward sloping since all firms, even the one
only selling to rich households, invest in the low-quality process innovation,
m = 1.
Appendix D (Chapter 2): Transitional Dynamics
2.10. APPENDIX 51
When the economy operates off the balanced growth path, there are either
only product innovations or only process innovations but not both:
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose the economy is in an equilibrium but not
necessary the steady state where both product and process innovation occur.
Since VN (t) = F and VM (t) = G hold, the instantaneous interest rate is given
by
r(t) = L [qlμP (t)− (1− β)qlμR(t)− βal] /G = (1− β)L(qhμR(t)− ah)/F.
(2.21)
The Euler equations of rich and poor, and the resource constraint read
μ˙R(t)/μR(t) = r(t)− ρ− N˙(t)/N(t), μ˙P (t)/μP (t) = r(t)− ρ− M˙(t)/M(t),
M˙(t)G+ N˙(t)F = L (ψN(t)γ + (1− ψ)M(t)γ)1/γ − LβM(t)al − L(1− β)N(t)ah.
We reduce this system of differential equations to get a single equation in μR(t)
and M(t)/N(t). Rewrite the resource constraint
M˙(t)
M(t)
M(t)
N(t)
G+
N˙(t)
N(t)
F = L
(
ψ + (1− ψ)
(
M(t)
N(t)
)γ)1/γ
−LβM(t)
N(t)
al−L(1−β)ah ≡ φ
(
M(t)
N(t)
)
Rearranging (2.21) we get qlμP (t) = (1 − β) (ql + qhG/F )μR(t) + βal − (1 −
β)ahG/F. We take the derivative and insert this into the Euler equation of the
poor to get
μ˙R(t)
μR(t) + [βal − (1− β)ahG/F ] / [(1− β) (ql + qhG/F )]
=
(1− β)L
F
(qhμR(t)− ah)− ρ−
(
M(t)
N(t)
G
)−1(
φ
(
M(t)
N(t)
)
− N˙(t)
N(t)
F
)
,
and use the Euler equation of the rich to form
μ˙R(t)
μR(t) + [βal − (1− β)ahG/F ] / [(1− β) (ql + qhG/F )]
+
μ˙R(t)
μR(t)
F
GM(t)/N(t)
=
(1− β)L
F
(qhμR(t)− ah)− ρ−
(
M(t)
N(t)
G
)−1(
φ
(
M(t)
N(t)
)
− (1− β)L(qhμR(t)− ah) + ρF
)
.
We see that μ˙R(t) is monotonically increasing in μR(t). Denote the steady state
level of μR(t) by μ
SS
R . Therefore, if μR(t) > (<)μ
SS
R , μR(t) will grow (fall)
without bound. Hence, there is only one equilibrium: μR(t) must immediately
adjust to μSSR . As μP (t) and μR(t) are monotonically related through (2.21)
the analoguous holds true for μP (t) as well. We conclude that in the presence
of both process and product innovations the economy is in steady state.


















































































